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Trends in Jewish Philanthropy

by STEVEN MARTIN COHEN

NEARLY TWO DECADES HAVE PASSED since Marshall Sklare first questioned whether support for Jewish philanthropic giving in the United States was deep and secure.[1] Sklare noted that the charitable drives of Jewish federations (central philanthropic agencies) in the largest communities enlisted the support of no more than a third of Jewish households. Moreover, significant variations in per capita giving from one locale to another implied important differences in the strength of local campaigns. Bemoaning the lack of hard data on various aspects of Jewish philanthropy, Sklare wrote: "None of the leading Jewish fund-raising institutions . . . has done so much as the most rudimentary market research concerning either the financial status of non-givers or the proportion of disposable income being contributed by donors."[2]

Since the time that Sklare wrote, several federations have conducted potentially valuable community surveys. Two such surveys—the 1965 and 1975 Boston studies[3]—are especially useful in answering questions about the past (and, by inference, the future) of American Jewish giving, because they include detailed, virtually identical questions on philanthropic behavior. Secondary analyses of the 1975 data set have already led to the tentative

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Note: The critical comments of Samuel C. Heilman, Harold Himmelfarb, Bernard Reisman, Paul Ritterband, and Marshall Sklare are deeply appreciated. The Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston made the data available. The research was supported by PSC-BHE Research Award #13031 from the City University of New York Research Foundation. Neither agency bears any responsibility for the interpretations contained herein.

[1]Marshall Sklare, "The Future of Jewish Giving," *Commentary*, November 1962, pp. 416–426. For a more pessimistic view, see Milton Goldin, *Why They Give: American Jews and Their Philanthropies* (New York, 1977). For background on American Jewish philanthropy, see Harry J. Lurie, *A Heritage Affirmed* (Philadelphia, 1961); Daniel J. Elazar, *Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry* (Philadelphia, 1976); the June 1977 issue of *Moment*; Marc Lee Raphael, "Jewish Philanthropy and Communal Democracy: In Pursuit of a Phantom," *Response*, Fall 1977, pp. 55–65; S.P. Goldberg, "Jewish Communal Services: Programs and Finances," *AJYB*, Vol. 78, 1978, pp. 172–221; and Charles S. Liebman, "Leadership and Decision-making in a Jewish Federation: The New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies," *AJYB*, Vol. 79, 1979, pp. 3–76.

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 420.

[3]Morris Axelrod, Floyd T. Fowler, Jr., and Arnold Gurin, *A Community Survey for Long Range Planning: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston, 1967) and Floyd J. Fowler, *1975 Community: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston, 1977).

conclusion that Jewish philanthropic support is likely to decline.[4] This article, analysing results from both the 1965 and 1975 surveys, builds upon and extends the earlier analyses.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JEWISH PHILANTHROPY

Support for Jewish philanthropy is crucial to the financial well-being of a wide variety of beneficiaries: local health and welfare services, camps, Jewish community centers, Jewish schools and supportive services, cultural institutions, national agencies, and, not least, social services in Israel. At the same time, Jewish charitable giving, particularly to the centralized drives of federations, constitutes an important social act in that it affirms the individual's ties to the community.[5] The frequency and generosity of giving, then, have implications which go far beyond the financial security of particular agencies. A strong philanthropic campaign reflects a coherent and well-integrated Jewish community. A weak campaign implies a partial unraveling of the ties that bind Jews together.

The social nature of Jewish charitable giving is reflected in the various fund-raising techniques employed by professional fund-raisers. Most preferred is the face-to-face solicitation.[6] This technique involves pairing a carefully chosen solicitor with a potential donor; often the solicitor and donor are friends or business associates. The solicitor seeks maximal prior knowledge of the prospect's family background, Jewish interests, and financial means, and brings this information to bear in a highly personalized plea for funds. Another effective fund-raising technique which relies on the social bonds between indentified Jews is the testimonial dinner. Here, business colleagues or members of a synagogue or Jewish organization are exhorted to purchase tickets to a reception and publicly pledge donations in honor of a prominent individual. Often, face-to-face solicitation of more affluent and generous givers precedes the dinner, the expectation being that they will serve as pace-setters for less wealthy or less dedicated donors. In recent years, members of an elite philanthropic group, the National UJA

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[4]Steven Martin Cohen, "Will Jews Keep Giving? Prospects for the Jewish Charitable Community," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service,* Autumn 1978, pp. 59–71; Paul Ritterband and Steven Martin Cohen, "Will the Well Run Dry? The Future of Jewish Giving in America," *Response,* Summer 1979, pp. 9–16.

[5]For the social function of charitable giving in a modern Orthodox synagogue, see Samuel C. Heilman, "The Gift of Alms: Face-to-Face Almsgiving among Orthodox Jews," *Urban Life and Culture,* January 1975, pp. 371–395.

[6]Aryeh Nesher, "Aryeh Nesher, Solicitor-General," *Moment,* June 1977, pp. 27–30, 60–62.

Young Leadership Cabinet (YLC), have taken to making "full financial disclosure" in a group setting. At their annual retreat, YLC members rise individually to describe their incomes and assets, propose a donation, and accept encouragement from friends and colleagues to attain even greater heights of generosity. That this method has proved to be phenomenally effective in generating contributions testifies to Jewish philanthropy's highly social nature.

An understanding of the social dimension of Jewish philanthropy is further enhanced when we note that the multitudinous solicitations of American Jewish donors grow out of a highly elaborate social apparatus. This apparatus is coordinated by professionals who maintain and mobilize a series of interlocking, hierarchically structured networks of lay leaders centered around different loci. Thus, the most prominent givers comprise a continent-wide network. They, in turn, are among the leaders of local networks centered around particular industries, trades, synagogues, Jewish organizations, or residential neighborhoods. These networks are, of course, critical for fund-raising. Equally important, however, they serve as pools from which Jewish communal organizations of every type can draw lay leaders.[7] In addition, the fund-raising apparatus generates a multiplicity of overlapping leadership circles in the Jewish community, thus serving to unite potentially competing factions.[8]

One final aspect of Jewish philanthropy's social dimension that merits attention is its impact in the political sphere. The ability of the organized Jewish community to raise millions of dollars annually cannot help but make a profound impression on political leaders and elected officials. For policy makers, these funds are a tangible measure of the Jewish community's cohesion and the degree of its support for the State of Israel and other Jewish concerns.

In sum, it is clear that the vitality of Jewish philanthropy is crucial to American Jewry in several ways: in terms of social coherence, leadership recruitment, institutional coordination, political impact, and, most obviously, the financial security of beneficiary agencies. Questions about the future of Jewish giving, then, are in reality questions about the future of organized Jewry.

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[7]Yohanon Manor and Gabriel Sheffer, "L'United Jewish Appeal ou la Métamorphose du Don," *Revue Française Sociologie,* Summer 1977, pp. 3–24.

[8]*Ibid.*

REASONS FOR PESSIMISM

The pessimistic outlook for Jewish giving is based, in the first instance, on what has been happening in terms of the actual dollar amounts collected. From the mid-1960's through the mid-1970's, the annual federation campaigns in the United States raised almost steadily-increasing sums of money. The 1965 nationwide total reached $131 million; in 1974, following the Yom Kippur War, that sum amounted to a record $660 million. In 1975, however, the total amount raised nationwide plummeted to $475 million; it has remained there ever since, even as inflation has eroded the purchasing power of the charitable dollar. The most recent estimate compiled by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds places the 1978 total at $480-485 million.

The experience in Boston mirrors that in the nation as a whole. In 1965 $5.3 million was raised; in 1975 the amount was $13.2 million. Then stagnation set in; between 1976 and 1978 collections rose by only one million dollars. In fiscal 1979, a year of nearly double digit inflation, there was a $200,000 decline to $14 million.

Adding to the pessimistic outlook for Jewish philanthropy are certain observed trends which seem to distinguish today's younger Jews. First, and most simply, they may well be less attached to the Jewish community (however it is defined) than their elders were when they were young. They belong to a later generation, and Jews who are generationally removed from the immigrant heritage, like members of other ethnic groups, less frequently undertake expressions of religious or ethnic attachment such as Jewish charitable giving.[9] Secondly, younger Jews have been shifting away from those occupations that have been characteristic for federation stalwarts;

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[9]Among various American ethnic groups, generation relates directly with several measures of assimilation: friendship and inter-ethnic marriage (See Harold J. Abramson, *Ethnic Diversity in Catholic America,* New York, 1973; Steven Martin Cohen, *Patterns of Interethnic Marriage and Friendship in the United States,* Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1974; and Richard D. Alba, "Social Assimilation Among American Catholic National-Origin Groups," *American Sociological Review,* December 1976, pp. 637–653); residence outside areas of ethnic concentration (Stanley Lieberson, *Ethnic Patterns in American Cities,* New York, 1963); lower levels of in-group solidarity sentiments (Cohen, *Patterns of Interethnic Marriage, op. cit.*); and less distinctive political orientations (Steven Martin Cohen and Robert E. Kapsis, "Religion, Ethnicity, and Party Affiliation in the United States: Evidence from Pooled Electoral Surveys, 1968–1972," *Social Forces,* December 1977, pp. 657–663).

With reference to Jews specifically, see Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Americans: Three Generations in a Jewish Community* (New Jersey, 1968); Axelrod et al., *op. cit.*; Fowler, *op. cit.*; Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier* (New York, 1967); Harold Himmelfarb, "The Interaction Effect of Parents, Spouse and Schooling: Comparing the Impact of Jewish and Catholic Schools," *The Sociological Quarterly,* Autumn 1977, pp. 464–477; and Harold Himmelfarb, "The Study of American Jewish Identification: How It is Defined, Measured, Obtained, Sustained, and Lost," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* forthcoming, 1980.

they are entering the salaried professions rather than becoming independent entrepreneurs.[10] The resulting shifts in type of work (from business to professions) and sources of income (from self-employed to salaried) mean that younger Jews will less often enter the pool of potential multi-millionaires, that group which has most generously supported federation drives in the past. The shift in source of income also means that a smaller fraction of total family income (even if it remains at a high level) will be of the disposable variety. One need not be overly cynical to realize that self-employed entrepreneurs have a greater ability to hide their income from the Internal Revenue Service than do most salaried professionals.

The shift in type of work to the professions also means that less social and economic pressure can be brought to bear on potential contributors. For people in business, charitable giving publically symbolizes success to their peers. As such, they make donations in part to enhance their social esteem. Moreover, when a business person is solicited by a customer, a gift's size can influence his or her commercial prospects. For professionals such as social workers, teachers, or other public employees, however, federation giving entails fewer potential rewards or punishments. A salaried professional's reputation is less firmly tied to public demonstrations of material success. His or her livelihood is not as often dependent on the good will of customers; those in a position to influence a professional's career—principals, editors, supervisors—are constrained by professional norms from making advancement contingent upon acceptable levels of charitable giving. Moreover, certain professions—particularly law, medicine, and college teaching—can become a way of life and thus successfully compete with ethnicity as a basis for self-definition.[11] As a result, individuals in these

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[10]Sidney Goldstein writes that data pertaining to "future trends in Jewish occupational composition . . . point to a continuing increase in the proportion of Jews engaged in professional work, and to either stability or actual decline for the managerial and proprietor group." See "American Jewry: A Demographic Analysis," in David Sidorsky (ed.), *The Future of the Jewish Community in America,* (Philadelphia, 1973), p. 118.

[11]See Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970). In his study of interreligious marriage, Fred Sherrow writes: "Intellectuals have been described as forming a kind of society of their own, even akin to an ethnic community. Thus not only do they reject the significance of such statuses as religion or ethnic origin in their behavior, but they may have little need for such identities, having developed surrogates for them" (Fred Sherrow, *Patterns of Religious Intermarriage Among American College Graduates,* Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971, pp. 142–143). On this point Sherrow cites Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York, 1964) and J. Wilensky and J. Ladinsky, "From Community to Occupational Group: Structural Assimilation Among Professors, Lawyers, and Engineers," *American Sociological Review,* August 1967, pp. 541–561. See also Andrew Greeley, *Why Can't They Be Like Us?* (New York, 1971), especially pp. 120–134; and Steven Martin Cohen, "Sociological Determinants of Interethnic Marriage and Friendship," *Social Forces,* June 1977, pp. 997–1010.

professions may feel less of a need to link themselves to the Jewish community through charitable giving.

Evidence of changes in the Jewish family adds to the pessimism regarding the future of Jewish philanthropy. We know that life cycle affects virtually all forms of voluntary participation.[12] Jewish communal participation, in particular, may be heightened by marriage and is almost certainly increased by the presence of children in the home.[13] At the same time, reliable information about American population trends and impressions about Jewish participation in those trends suggest an increase in what may be termed "alternative" Jewish households: singles, childless couples, and divorced or separated individuals. If the active Jewish community does, in fact, consist disproportionately of those in more conventional households (couples who now have or have raised children, as well as the widowed), and these households are diminishing in number, then Jewish giving will eventually suffer.

A number of trends, then, lead to the expectation that today's younger Jews will emerge less dedicated donors than their counterparts in the past. To test the validity of this expectation, as well as to determine the precise effects of diminishing Jewishness, occupational shift, and the decline of the conventional family on Jewish philanthropy, we turn to an analysis of the Boston data.

DATA AND MEASURES

This study is based on a secondary analysis of two random sample surveys of Jews residing in the Boston metropolitan area. The University of Massachusetts Survey Research Center conducted the surveys on behalf of the Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston. The data were collected in face-to-face interviews, totalling 1,569 in 1965 and 932 in 1975. Respondents were chosen in two ways. First, a large number were randomly selected from a master list of Jews known to the organized Jewish community. Due to cost considerations, a much smaller number of Jews were located via a random area sampling procedure. Since the latter group represented a proportion of the universe larger than their proportion in the sample, weighting procedures were used which had the effect of multiplying those respondents not found on the master list.

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[12]David Knoke and Randall Thomson, "Voluntary Association Membership Trends and the Family Life Cycle," *Social Forces*, September 1977, pp. 45–65.

[13]Himmelfarb, "The Study of American Jewish Identification," *loc. cit.*, and Sklare and Greenblum, *op. cit.*

The special characteristics of Boston's Jews affect the extent to which observations from these data can be generalized to the rest of American Jewry. Greater Boston's Jewish population of 180,000 in the middle 1970's placed it sixth behind New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Miami.[14] The total amount ($13 million) contributed to its annual federation campaign in 1975 (Combined Jewish Philanthropies) was similar to that given in comparably-sized communities (e.g., Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, Miami, and San Francisco). As in other metropolitan areas, substantial numbers of Jews have left Boston's central city neighborhoods for the suburbs over the last two decades. An extensive and well-established Jewish institutional infrastructure, as well as a very large number of colleges and universities, distinguish Boston from other cities. As a corollary, Boston Jewry is disproportionately young. In order to adjust for the tremendous increase in the number of students and other young people between 1965 and 1975, the 1975 survey was weighted so that its age distribution replicated that of the earlier survey.

The analysis below focuses on two aspects of giving. First, did the respondent's household contribute to the CJP campaign during the last 12 months? Second, how much did the household contribute to all Jewish causes aside from synagogue-related expenses?

To assess the importance of Jewish orientation in influencing philanthropic behavior, the full range of Jewish identificational items available in both data sets were canvassed. Interestingly, in this sphere, behavior is a much more potent predictor of giving than are attitudes about such matters as the importance of a Jewish education, a preference for Jewish friends and neighbors, hypothetical reactions to an intermarriage in the family, and the salience of the State of Israel. Thus, the Jewishness scale used in this study awards two points if the respondent attends religious services during the high holidays or more often; two points for those who perform at least two of the following rituals: take part in a Passover Seder, light Sabbath candles, keep kosher at home; and one point if the respondent belongs to a Jewish organization. This index will be referred to as the Jewish Activities scale.

Consistent with the rationale advanced above, two aspects of occupation were taken into account: source of income (self-employed or salaried) and type of work (professional or non-professional). Cross-classifying these two aspects yields four distinct occupational categories.

Preliminary analysis of several types of households yielded three clusters. First, there are the conventional households: married couples with children living at home or those with grown children. At the other extreme in terms

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[14]Alvin Chenkin, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1976," *AJYB*, Vol. 77, 1977, pp. 229–239.

of philanthropic behavior are three household types which can be grouped under the alternative rubric: singles; divorced or separated individuals; and married couples without children. The widowed, a third category, are treated separately since their philanthropic patterns differ from those of the other two groups.

Since about a third of the sample refused to provide information on family income, income was estimated for those respondents by using prediction equations employing education, occupation, and monthly housing costs. Somewhat different equations were used in the two surveys. Since inflation accounted for a large growth in income between 1965 and 1975, both income and the amount contributed to Jewish charity in 1965 were multiplied by 2.395, a factor which was chosen so as to make identical the 1965 and 1975 mean incomes of mature individuals, i.e., those over 30.

Age, the critical independent variable, is that of the male adult member of the household, or that of the female adult if no male is present. Alternative measures, such as averaging male and female ages or giving precedence to the age of the female, resulted in more modest relationships with the dependent variables.

Finally, it should be noted that the household and not the individual is the unit of analysis.

FINDINGS

Age, Period, and Cohort Effects

Table 1, which reports levels of philanthropic activity by age and period, lends itself to three types of comparisons, each of which yields different sorts of inferences. First, we can read the table vertically and examine changes in philanthropic behavior by age while holding period constant. Such a comparison, in conjunction with other comparisons and information, would permit inferences about age or life-cycle effects—how does philanthropic activity rise or fall as people get older? Second, we can read the columns diagonally, from upper left to lower right, to trace various birth cohorts, learning about one of many types of period effects. Of course, each birth cohort not only passes into a new period of history, it also ages by ten years. Inferred period effects, therefore, have to take into account probable age effects. Finally, we can supplement both sorts of comparisons with a horizontal reading of the table to infer cohort effects, i.e., differences in philanthropic behavior arising out of differences in time of birth and socialization. Since there is no clear-cut method for unraveling age, period, and cohort effects, the wisest course is to attempt to achieve a comprehensive

Table 1
Philanthropic Behavior by Age, 1965 and 1975

Age at Time of Survey	Per Cent Giving to CJP 1965	1975	Rate[c]	Amount Given[a] 1965	1975	Rate	Givers Only[b] 1965	1975	Rate
20–29	17	12	.71	23	53	2.30	80	321	4.01
30–39	64	25	.39	236	268	1.14	362	607	1.68
40–49	70	46	.66	302	252	.83	453	392	.87
50–59	72	61	.85	413	211	.51	618	282	.46
60+	61	53	.87	247	198	.80	474	326	.69
Total	60	43	.72	263	205	.78	463	367	.80

a. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue, in constant (1975) dollars.

b. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue, in constant (1975) dollars, excluding those who gave less than $25.

c. "Rate" is the retention rate, the 1975 entry divided by the adjoining 1965 entry for the same age group.

understanding of the data, informed by an intelligent use of side information.[15]

Examining the frequency of giving to the CJP campaign (irrespective of amount donated), we can reasonably infer the broad contours of an age or life-cycle effect. People in their 20's are consistently infrequent contributors. The rate of giving rises until the upper 50's, when it takes a downward turn. It is important to note, however, that there are considerable differences in the age contours of the two samples. In 1965, giving rises sharply (by age 30) to a plateau and largely remains there, whereas in 1975 giving in the 20's starts out quite low (a 12 per cent rate) and rises only gradually in each succeeding cohort, until it peaks in the 50's age group.

There are two plausible explanations for the divergent contours, with very different implications for the future of Jewish philanthropy. The more benign explanation suggests that, for some reason, by 1975 only middle-aged and elderly Jews regarded charitable giving as normative. Thus, although fewer young Jews contributed, as compared with 1965, the overall frequency of donations is likely to remain stable, since they can be expected to increase their rate of giving as they age. Alternately, it is possible that

[15]For an excellent discussion of the need to resolve the ambiguities in cohort data by applying informed theory to the anaysis, see Norval Glenn, *Cohort Analysis* (Beverly Hills, 1977).

the younger cohorts who began to mature between 1965 and 1975 are permanently less inclined to give than their predecessors. In other words, frequent giving is characteristic of only certain birth cohorts (according to these data, those born earlier than 1935).

Diagonal and horizontal comparisons lend support to the birth cohort, as opposed to the age explanation. Diagonally we find that all cohorts but one (the youngest group in 1965) experienced declines in frequency of giving from 1965 to 1975. The youngest group's rate increased from 17 to 25 per cent, but did so only slightly because powerful aging effects barely won out over period and cohort effects. If those in their 20's in 1965 had replicated the behavior of the group ten years older in that year, they would have risen to a 64 per cent level rather than a 25 per cent rate.

A horizontal comparison of each 1975 age group with its predecessor in 1965 is also revealing. We may divide the 1975 rates by the 1965 rates to derive, in effect, a rate of retention. A retention rate of 2.00 would mean that giving doubled for that group over the ten-year interval; a rate of retention of .50 would mean that the frequency was cut in half. Interestingly, the rate of retention is highest among the oldest Jews, and through age 30 declines steadily cohort by cohort. The only reason the retention rate is so high (.71) among those in their 20's is that the base rate of 17 per cent in 1965 is so low to begin with. In other words, the decline in overall frequency of giving between 1965 and 1975 is most directly attributable to declines among the youngest age groups, precisely those Jews whose behavior is most important in terms of the future of Jewish giving.

When we turn to the amounts given to all Jewish causes, a very different picture emerges. Apparently, while younger Jews give less frequently than their predecessors, they contribute much more generously when they do. Retention rates of total dollars given are highest for the youngest groups and decline through age 59, before turning slightly upward for the elderly. (The latter phenomenon is attributable in part to a rather low 1965 base for those 60 and older.) The inference of a shrinking but far more generous donor base is even more clearly supported when we consider only those who made a meaningful ($25 or more per year) contribution. The "givers-only" columns in Table 1 show that the youngest group in 1975 is four times as generous as its predecessor, while the 30–39 group in 1975 is one and two-thirds times as generous as its 1965 counterpart. All other groups are less forthcoming in 1975 than were their predecessors.

The 1965–75 period witnessed changes not only in the rate and extent of Jewish philanthropy, but also in the distribution of those characteristics which influence charitable behavior. Table 2 reports trends in household type, occupation, income, and Jewish orientation.

With reference to household type, "alternative" families are found most frequently in the youngest age category, decline as one moves up the age

Table 2
Distributions of Household and Occupational Types; Mean Family Income (in constant 1975 dollars) and Jewish Activities by Age, 1965 and 1975

	1965					1975				
Age	20–9	30–9	40–9	50–9	60+	20–9	30–9	40–9	50–9	60+
Household Types (%)										
Alternative[a]	63	18	8	14	19	89	40	12	13	18
Conventional[b]	35	79	86	78	53	11	60	85	83	54
Widowed	2	3	6	8	28	0	0	3	4	28
Occupational Types (%)										
Self-employed Pros	2	11	8	7	12	4	36	28	22	20
Entrepreneurs	5	22	31	36	45	8	17	19	39	30
Salaried Pros	59	35	12	16	8	44	33	24	14	14
Non-pro. Workers	34	31	48	41	35	45	27	42	36	47
Retirees[c]	0	0	0	(5)	(47)	0	0	0	(2)	(51)
Mean Family Income (in $1,000)	18	35	36	32	19	13	37	35	35	17
Mean Jewish Activities	3.6	3.9	4.2	4.2	4.2	3.0	3.1	3.9	3.8	3.8

a. Singles, childless married couples, and divorced and separated who have not remarried.
b. Married couples with children living at home or who have raised children, now away from home.
c. Retirees are excluded from occupational computations.

ladder, and turn slightly upward in the older years as unmarried divorcé(e)s accumulate. Widows and widowers, of course, are concentrated in the later years. Conventional families peak in the 40–59 age range and trail off somewhat above age 60. Most critically, the number of alternative households has grown considerably between 1965 and 1975. In 1965, 63 per cent of family heads in their 20's were living in alternative homes, while in 1975, 89 per cent do so. Among those aged 30–39, the figure for alternative households increases from 18 per cent in 1965 to 40 per cent in 1975, owing largely to a later marrying age and a decline in the birthrate.

The 1965 and 1975 data sets employed different coding schemes for occupation, and it may well be that the latter set is more accurate. In fact, the data for 1975 more clearly illustrate occupational patterns which have been thought to characterize American Jewry in recent years. Reading from older to younger groups, we find a steady growth (through age 30) in the

proportion of salaried and self-employed professionals. Commensurately, there is a nearly consistent decline in the percentage of self-employed non-professionals (largely entrepreneurs) and a wavering in the proportion of salaried nonprofessionals (workers). The youngest group, 20–29 in age, must be treated with caution since so many of its members have not yet entered their chosen careers; presumably they will end up confirming the trend toward the professions. The 1965 data show the same patterns, although somewhat less clearly. In short, there is irrefutable evidence of a movement toward the professions and away from entrepreneurship, and a lesser trend toward salaried jobs as opposed to self-employment.

Since the 1965 income figures were multiplied by 2.395, it is not surprising that the two surveys show roughly the same age contours with respect to income. Income is lowest at the oldest and youngest extremes and is at a high plateau between ages 30 and 59. Interestingly, the youngest group's income in 1965 is higher in constant dollars than that of its 1975 counterpart. This finding is consistent with the presumed tendency of the latter to study longer for a professional career and to marry later, actions which would have the effect of postponing high income levels.

Finally, the Jewish Activities index reveals life-cycle, period, and cohort effects. The two surveys display some similarity in their age contours: low Jewish Activity in the 20's and relatively high activity after the age of 40. This pattern is similar to the contour for frequency of giving. However, the leap to a higher plateau of Jewish Activities takes place largely among the 30–39 age group in 1965 and is postponed until the ages 40–49 in the 1975 survey. This finding would seem to indicate a cohort effect: younger Jews in 1975 may well be inherently "less Jewish" on the whole than their elders. While every age group in 1975 reports fewer Jewish Activity means than similarly aged counterparts in 1965, the declines are unevenly distributed: they are smaller (between .3 and .4) for the older (above 40) groups and larger (.6 and .8) for the younger groups.

Younger Jews in 1975 are, then, distinguished from their elders and predecessors in that they more frequently live in alternative households, more often pursue professional careers, and perform fewer Jewish Activities. It is not only the distribution of these characteristics among Jews that has been changing, however, but also the relationship between each trait and charitable activity.

The Growing Importance of Jewishness

Federations were established by the Jewish social elite in various metropolitan areas during the early 20th century. In many communities, New York being a prime example, somewhat assimilated, wealthy Jews of German background were the most active philanthropists. Their aim was

to assure that the very foreign, indigent, East European immigrants who were arriving in the United States in large numbers quickly acculturated and moved out of poverty, thus avoiding any embarrassment to their more established coreligionists. While East Europeans eventually replaced German Jews as federation stalwarts, Jewish philanthropic giving remained for many years largely the province of affluent and relatively assimilated Jews. As a result, informed observers held a somewhat accurate stereotype of the Jewish philanthropist: he or she was active in Jewish public affairs but uninvolved in private Jewish behaviors.

In recent years a new group of philanthropists is thought to have replaced the old-line activists, a group motivated less by a sense of *noblesse oblige* than by particularistic religio-ethnic concerns. Thus, Charles Liebman found that the members of New York Federation's most powerful lay body (the Distribution Committee) in 1978 had higher levels of Jewish education, synagogue membership, and survivalist religio-ethnic attitudes than their 1968 predecessors.[16] If a parallel situation were to obtain among Boston Jewry's mass donor base as well, one would expect certain trends to emerge in the survey data. In 1965 private Jewish behaviors should have a limited impact on giving, while public Jewish involvement should significantly influence charitable activity. In 1975, on the other hand, the association of private behaviors with giving should show a marked increase.

Table 3 presents mean rates of CJP donations and annual amounts given by the various items and subindices which make up the Jewish Activities scale. Adjoining the main columns are difference scores, i.e., the difference in giving behavior found by subtracting the scores of the least Jewish category from the most Jewish category in each instance. Thus we can compare the effect, for instance, of having a seder, or lighting Sabbath candles, or keeping kosher in three ways: across years (the most critical comparison), across types of giving behavior (rate and amount), and across activities.

In terms of private and semi-private Jewish behaviors (the three rituals and synagogue attendance, but not organizational membership) we find a consistent pattern: both forms of Jewishness have a much greater impact on giving in 1975 than in 1965. Thus, those performing all three rituals in 1965 were only 11 per cent more likely to give to the CJP than those performing none (interestingly, they were *less* likely to give than those performing two rituals); by 1975, the impact had grown five times to a total of 56 per cent. Similarly, the amount given (in constant dollars) grew from a difference score of $108 to $375. With one exception (the impact of total rituals on the amount given) the growth in impact of rituals and service

[16]Liebman, *op. cit.*

Table 3
Philanthropic Behavior by Jewish Activities Items and Indices, 1965 and 1975

	Per Cent Giving to CJP				Amount Given[a]			
	1965	Dif.[b]	1975	Dif.	1965	Dif.	1975	Dif.
Take part in a Seder?								
Yes	62		51		284		240	
No	46	16	10	41	97	187	36	204
Light Sabbath candles?								
Yes	63		51		274		280	
No	55	8	38	13	236	38	135	145
Keep Kosher at home?								
Yes	60		57		195		345	
No	60	0	41	16	248	−89	174	171
Sum of above rituals								
3	59		64		196		401	
2	68		45		333		225	
1	55		48		284		171	
0	47	11	8	56	88	108	36	375
Synagogue attendance[c]								
4+	65		60		345		340	
3	56		52		210		177	
0–2	56	9	23	37	155	190	91	241
Jewish organization memberships								
3+	86		65		750		517	
2	78		53		479		240	
1	55		48		126		180	
0	50	36	31	34	120	630	101	416

a. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue, in constant (1975) dollars.

b. Difference in philanthropic behavior between highest and lowest categories of items or indices.

c. Synagogue attendance: 4+ = more often than high holidays; 3 = high holidays; 0–2 = less often than high holidays or never.

attendance upon giving is due to a decline in donations among the less Jewishly active respondents rather than an increase in charity among those most actively committed to Jewish life. It would appear, then, that philanthropic activity is becoming increasingly confined to those Jews who regularly act out their Jewishness; they maintain traditional levels of giving even as growing numbers of less-involved Jews turn away from philanthropy.

While the impact of rituals and service attendance on both the frequency and amount of giving grew significantly between 1965 and 1975, the impact of organizational involvement was of a different sort. In terms of the rate of giving, the influence of organizational membership was largely stable (declining slightly from 36 to 34 per cent), while in terms of the amount given there was a noticeable decline (from $630 to $416). What these data may indicate is that Jewish role specialization is coming to an end. In the past those Jews who were privately religious may not have been very likely to join fraternal organizations or agency boards. At the same time, those who were communally active (and hence likely to give to a communal charitable drive) were not drawn from the most ritually observant sectors of the Jewish community. By 1975, however, the less observant Jews (measured by ritual performance and synagogue attendance) had largely dropped out of organized Jewish life. Consistent with this notion, the various subindices of Jewish Activity display only weak correlations in 1965, but are significantly stronger in 1975 (data not shown). At the present time, then, only those Jews who are committed to living a Jewish life in the private sphere will be likely to express a commitment to Jewish life in the public (communal) sphere.

The changing overall impact of rituals, synagogue attendance, and organizational membership can be understood via an eta correlation ratio, a summary statistic which indicates the influence of the Jewish Activities index on charitable behavior (Table 4).

The correlation ratios essentially confirm the tabular results reported in Table 3. Examining the second row (with controls for the three other independent variables), we find barely any net relationship between Jewish Activities and charitable behavior in 1965 (etas = .13 and .11). In 1975 the comparable relationships between Jewish Activities and giving is much stronger (etas = .31 and .18 respectively).

The increasing impact of Jewish Activities on charitable behavior does not bode well for the future of Jewish philanthropy. The proportion of Jewishly involved Jews is declining, while the growing segment of relatively assimilated Jews is giving less frequently and generously than its counterparts in the past.

Table 4
Effects of Jewish Activities upon Philanthropic Behavior, 1965 and 1975

	Per Cent Giving to CJP[a]		Amount Given[b]	
	1965	1975	1965	1975
Controls				
None	.23	.39	.20	.24
Age, household & income	.13	.31	.11	.18

a. Entries in the first row are etas, or correlation ratios. Entries in the second row are betas. Both are derived from Multiple Classification Analysis.

b. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue, in constant (1975) dollars.

Occupational Shift

It was suggested above that charitable behavior should be greater among the self-employed than among the salaried, and greater among those in business than in the professions. Moreover, it was argued that the number of professionals is increasing while the proportion of entrepreneurs is declining. The validity of the above hypotheses remains to be examined.

Table 5 reports frequency of giving and average amounts donated by occupational categories in 1965 and 1975. Since both income and age are related to occupation, controls for these variables are introduced.

The data for 1965 largely support the conventional wisdom regarding differential charitable behavior by occupations. Without controls, we find high rates of giving among the self-employed (81 per cent) and much less frequent giving among salaried non-professionals (60 per cent), salaried professionals (47 per cent), and the retired (40 per cent). These relationships are narrowed somewhat when income and age are held constant (eta, the overall measure of effect, declines from .32 to .18), but the self-employed still lead other occupational groups. In terms of amounts given, the entrepreneurs are most generous ($563 per household per year), followed, rather distantly, by self-employed professionals ($297) and the others. Controls for income and age significantly narrow occupational differences as eta drops from .24 to .10. Relative to their age and income, retirees are as generous as entrepreneurs, who are only slightly more forthcoming than salaried professionals and workers. Interestingly, given their income and, to a lesser

Table 5
Philanthropic Behavior by Occupation, Controlling for Age and Income, 1965 and 1975

	Per Cent Giving to CJP		Amount Given[a]	
Controls	None	Age, Inc.	None	Age, Inc.
1965				
Self-employed pros	81	71	297	164
Entrepreneurs	81	69	563	327
Salaried professionals	47	58	219	285
Non-pro. Workers	60	62	130	222
Retired	40	46	122	324
Eta	.32	.18	.24	.10
1975				
Self-employed pros	50	52	530	384
Entrepreneurs	53	46	261	145
Salaried professionals	43	55	161	227
Non-pro. Workers	34	37	136	215
Retired	45	28	91	88
Eta	.15	.19	.26	.16

a. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue, in constant (1975) dollars.

extent, their age, self-employed professionals emerge, in 1965, as the least generous occupational group.

The patterns in 1975 deviate from those in 1965. Once again, without controls the self-employed are the most frequent donors, although only by a small margin. Holding age and income constant, however, self-employed and salaried professionals are the most frequent givers, again by a small margin. Turning to amounts given, we find very high giving among self-employed professionals, amounts that are reduced but remain substantial when income and age are taken into account. Far behind in second place are entrepreneurs. They are about half as generous as self-employed professionals; with controls for age and income they emerge as less charitable than any other non-retired occupational group.

This finding is indeed propitious: self-employed professionals—one of the two growing occupational categories—are apparently fairly frequent donors and, even more importantly, very generous donors. This finding may be peculiar to Boston insofar as the CJP has expended much effort to raise

funds among the community's affluent attorneys, a group which makes up a large percentage of the self-employed professionals. Analysis reveals that lawyers are indeed the most generous professionals in the sample, with physicians being the least generous. Even if the Boston findings in this case are not applicable to the rest of the country, they certainly do point to the potential effectiveness of philanthropic campaigns focused on key occupational groups.

Gross categories of the character of work (professional versus non-professional) seem to bear little relationship to the frequency or generosity of giving. The nature of income—both its amount and its disposability as indicated by self-employed or salaried status—seems to be the key factor in mediating occupation's influence on the charitable act.

While self-employed professionals may well be replacing self-employed business people as larger than average donors, their replacement value is limited in two ways. First, the growth increase in the number of self-employed professionals is not as large as the decline in the number of entrepreneurs. The salaried professions are claiming many of those who in previous periods might have gone into business. Second, the data do not embrace people capable of the very highest levels of giving. Fund-raisers report that "superdonors", who are quite rare but extremely crucial to successful campaigns, are invariably drawn from the most affluent business sectors. Thus, while self-employed professionals can perhaps replace entrepreneurs in the second or third echelon of donors, they cannot replenish the thinning ranks of multimillionaire philanthropists.

Alternative Households

The three groups making up the alternative household type—singles, childless married couples, and divorced or separated people—score low on the Jewish Activities scale (data not shown). The reasons for this pattern probably have to do with the Jewish community's family-centeredness. The unmarried and couples without children apparently find little need to become participants in the organized Jewish community until children are born. At that point, parents may become more concerned with ritual observance in the home and may affiliate with a synagogue in order to send their children to religious school. This involvement, in turn, brings the family into a Jewish orbit where it is subject to pressure to support Jewish causes. Divorcé(e)s (with or without children) are as remote from the Jewish community as are singles and non-parents. Those without children apparently feel little need to affiliate; those with children, while making frequent use of such federation services as day-care centers and summer camps, apparently have little time available for voluntary organizations.

These general patterns are portrayed in Table 6, which reports philanthropic behavior for three household categories.

In both 1965 and 1975 alternative households are the least frequent and least generous donors. In 1965 they donated slightly more than half as often as conventional families (37 as against 70 per cent). In 1975 the absolute difference in rates is about the same, but alternative giving is now less than half as frequent as in conventional households (20 as opposed to 52 per cent). Since alternative households tend to be younger and less affluent than conventional households, we need controls for income and age to obtain the net effect of household type on giving. Taking this into account, we find that in 1965 an original difference between alternative and conventional households of 33 percentage points in the giving rate is reduced to 14 points (51 as against 65 per cent); in 1975 the reduction is less dramatic—from 32 to 19 percentage points (30 as opposed to 49 per cent).

Similar patterns are manifested in terms of the amounts given. In both years, large initial differences in amounts given are explained by differences in age and income. Once these controls are introduced, the difference in 1965 between alternative and conventional households shrinks to a mere $54 ($267 as against $213); in 1975 the difference stands at $140 ($245 as against $105).

Table 6
Philanthropic Behavior by Household Type, Controlling for Age and Income, 1965 and 1975.

	Per Cent Giving to CJP		Amount Given[a]	
Controls	None	Age, Inc.	None	Age, Inc.
1965				
Alternative[b]	37	51	90	213
Conventional	70	65	339	267
Widowed	46	48	134	332
Eta	.28	.14	.15	.04
1975				
Alternative	20	30	72	105
Conventional	52	49	273	245
Widowed	52	45	165	265
Eta	.29	.17	.18	.13

a. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue.
b. See Table 2 for household type definitions.

Widows and widowers display quite different patterns. In 1965 their giving frequency places them near the alternative households; ten years later, their giving rates approximate that of conventional families. In both years, widow(er)s' contributions are rather small; in light of their reduced income, however, they emerge when controls are introduced as the most generous group.

We have already seen how alternative households grew in number between 1965 and 1975. Now we learn, based on the Jewish Activities scale (not shown), that such households have moved further away from the Jewish community in general and, as demonstrated in Table 6, from philanthropic behavior in particular. The growing estrangement of alternative households from organized Jewry reflects recently developed institutional supports for singles, childless couples, and the divorced. These people can now find many individuals like themselves with whom to associate; they expect and demand greater acceptance of their household status as normative; they may even regard that status as permanent rather than transitory. Members of alternative households, then, are in no great need of the support of the conventional community, and are less likely to seek to emulate the behavior of conventional households.

The Diminishing Importance of Income

The simultaneous impact of the four predictors—age, occupation, income, and Jewish Activities—on giving can be understood by means of regression equations. The standardized regression coefficients (and etas) in Table 7 report the net impact of each predictor on the dependent variable controlling simultaneously for the three other determinants of charitable giving. (Since the impact of household type, once age and income are taken into account, is largely mediated via Jewish Activities, the former is excluded from the integrative analysis presented here.)

Looking first at frequency of CJP giving, we find that income and age are the most important determinants of giving in 1965, with Jewish Activities and occupation displaying smaller but nearly equivalent effects. In 1975 the picture is very different: while age retains its potency, income no longer has any effect on the likelihood of giving; Jewish Activities have become as important as age; and occupation retains a slight but noticeable effect. On the amount given side, we note that in 1965 only income has any appreciable impact on the size of charitable contributions. In 1975 income's influence has diminished while that of Jewish Activities has increased somewhat.

Another way to understand income's changing impact on giving is to consider the unstandardized coefficients (in parentheses) which report the net increase in the dependent variable per thousand dollar increase in income. Thus, in 1965 every $1,000 in income (in 1975 dollars) means a ½

Table 7
Regressions of Philanthropic Behaviors upon Age, Income, Occupation, and Jewish Activities, 1965 and 1975

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	
	Gave to CJP[a]	Amount given[b]
1965		
Age	.28	.14
Income	.25 (.005)	.56 (17.31)
Occupation	.15	.09
Jewish Activities	.14	.11
R	.505	.570
R^2	.255	.324
1975		
Age	.32	.12
Income	.00 (.00)	.43 (9.62)
Occupation	.15	.14
Jewish Activities	.31	.18
R	.490	.486
R^2	.240	.235

a. Entries are eta/beta coefficients reported using Multiple Classification Analysis. Entries in parentheses are unstandardized coefficients indicating net unit change in the dependent variable per $1,000 change in income.

b. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue.

per cent increase in the likelihood of making a CJP contribution; in 1975 income has no effect on the likelihood of giving. In 1965 every $1,000 means a $17.31 increase in the size of annual contributions to all Jewish causes. By 1975 income's net impact is reduced by almost one-half to $9.62.

The diminishing influence of income and the growing importance of Jewishness reflect a changing rationale for Jewish philanthropy. Whereas in the past philanthropic giving was undertaken as a way of symbolizing economic success and securing social standing, today it is much more a reflection of Jewish commitment. Third- and fourth-generation Jews feel little need to display their wealth or shore up their social standing. Moreover, the breakdown of social barriers against Jewish entry into formerly non-Jewish social circles makes it more likely that they will contribute to non-Jewish charitable causes.

While the act of giving is unaffected by income and very much influenced by Jewishness in 1975, the opposite pattern holds true in terms of the

amount given: income retains a major impact on the size of contributions while the influence of Jewishness is much smaller. Putting things crudely, it appears that deciding whether to give is a Jewish decision; deciding what to give is an economic one.

CONCLUSION

This study was initiated to test the validity of a pessimistic prognosis of the future of Jewish philanthropy. This view has been largely borne out by the data, but the picture is far from one-sided. Today's younger Jews are indeed less likely to contribute to organized Jewish philanthropy, but when they give they are more generous than their elders or predecessors.

Several factors underlie these trends. First, today's younger Jews are less Jewishly involved than their predecessors of ten years ago. At the same time, Jewish activity has become a more important predictor of charitable behavior. Second, the decline in Jewishness is itself explained by a shift away from conventional households, toward alternative households. Not only have the latter become much more numerous among the under-40 group, they have moved further away from the Jewish community in general and from Jewish philanthropic giving in particular. Third, Jews are less often entering the business world and are more frequently becoming self-employed and salaried professionals. The shift toward the professions is apparently less consequential than the shift toward salaried occupations. Relatively fewer Jews in the future will amass large fortunes. Also, fewer will have the incentive of the self-employed to contribute to philanthropy of any sort. Fourth, the wealthy can no longer be expected to serve as philanthropic stalwarts. Jewish philanthropy has become less elitist (in financial terms) than in the past.

It is clear that Jewish involvement has become philanthropy's capital stock, and that that stock is badly in need of replenishment. The self-interest of federations, then, requires that they seek to improve Jewish socialization. Moreover, since the Jewishly identified segment of the community is increasingly important in terms of Jewish charitable giving, federations might well want to adopt policies which conform more closely to its values and outlook.

The decline of conventional families, coupled with their importance for the charitable campaigns, implies that federations have an interest in promoting policies favorable to marriage, marital happiness, and fertility. However, given that long-term demographic trends have classically resisted manipulation by public policy, federations will have to address themselves to the growth of singles, childless couples, and the divorced in more immediate terms. Federations can decide to focus on the needs of alternative

families and make efforts to better incorporate them into the Jewish community or they can focus fund-raising efforts on those families who have the greatest propensity to give, i.e., conventional households.

The changing Jewish occupational picture implies that fund-raising mechanisms which in the past were constructed around business circles should be replicated in the future around the professions. Indeed, Boston's CJP, as well as other federations, have shifted their organizing efforts to the professions with some apparent success. The declining number of self-employed Jews, however, poses a much greater, if not insurmountable, challenge to professional fund-raisers, since salaried status implies not only lower incomes, but less disposable income as well.

The broadening base of philanthropic support could well mean that the classical preponderance of a small number of wealthy families in each community's philanthropic circle may not obtain in the future. Federation leadership may pass to individuals of more moderate means who have a relatively strong commitment to Jewish life. Indeed, this process appears to be already underway.

Whether these trends will continue, whether policies will be enacted to deal with them, and, if so, whether they will have the desired effects remains, of course, to be seen. What is certain is that fewer donors and decreased giving would have far-reaching implications for the future of American Jewry. Such an eventuality would mean not only weakened financial support for Jewish agencies, but, in addition, lessened unity within the Jewish community, poorer recruitment of lay leaders for all aspects of organizational life, and, quite possibly, diminished Jewish political influence.

Israelis in the United States: Motives, Attitudes, and Intentions

by DOV ELIZUR

ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES are nations of immigrants. At the same time, both countries have experienced considerable emigration. Of the 13,000 Jews who arrived in Palestine in 1926, for example, more than half left; in 1927 emigration, for the first time, exceeded immigration.[1] Recent studies indicate that in certain periods as many as one third of the immigrants to the United States re-emigrated.[2] While studies of migration have focused mainly on the adjustment problems of immigrants, recent literature has begun to take note of the movement of emigrants back to their countries of origin. Appleyard and Richmond have investigated British emigrants returning to the United Kingdom from Australia and Canada;[3] Cerase has studied Italians returning from the United States;[4] Engel has examined Americans returning from Israel;[5] and Toren has focused on Israelis returning from the United States and France.[6]

The growing number of Israelis residing abroad is of special significance, because Israel is a small country and its existence depends on a steadily increasing population. Since the inception of the Jewish State, Israeli society has been subjected to unprecedented psychological pressure from the

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[1]Golda Meir, *My Life* (New York, 1976), p. 82.

[2]A. Antonovsky and A.D. Katz, *From the Golden to the Promised Land,* (Darby, 1979), p. 15; T.J. Samuel, "Migrations of Canadians to the U.S.A.: The Causes," *International Migration,* 1969, pp. 106–116.

[3]R.T. Appleyard, *British Emigration to Australia* (Canberra, 1964), and A.B. Richmond, "Demographic and Family Characteristics of British Immigrants Returning from Canada," *International Migration,* 1966, pp. 21–27.

[4]F. P. Cerase, "Expectations and Reality: A Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy," *International Migration Review,* 1974, pp. 245–262.

[5]G. Engel, "Comparison Between Americans Living in Israel and Those Who Returned to America," *The Journal of Psychology,* 1970, *74,* pp. 195–204; *75,* pp. 243–251; *76,* 117–123.

[6]N. Toren, *Characteristics, Motives for Returning, and Intentions to Stay of Returning Israeli Citizens* (Jerusalem, 1974).

outside. Tension has also resulted from the inter-ethnic strain of the Israeli melting-pot. Thus, some Israelis going abroad want nothing more than to relax; many others, however, have the aim of acquiring education or professional skills, of improving their economic situation, or of exploring life abroad.

Emigration from Israel is frequently stigmatized as unpatriotic; it evokes negative sentiments and even hostility on the part of government officials and the general public. While immigrants who come to Israel are described as *olim* ("going up"), those leaving the country are labelled *yordim* ("going down"). Yet, with a growing number of Israelis residing abroad, the social stigma of being a *yored* has significantly lessened.

Because Israeli emigrants constitute a significant sub-ethnic group among Jews in various countries, including the United States, Canada, South Africa, and parts of Europe, it is possible to investigate their motives, attitudes, and intentions with regard to the choice of a country of residence. The present study, based on data collected from two samples of Israelis residing in the United States, analyzes their reasons for going abroad, their sense of identity (Jewish, Israeli, and American), and their considerations both for and against returning to Israel.

Estimates of the extent of the *yeridah* phenomenon vary. According to official statistics, over 300,000 Israeli citizens are residing abroad.[7] The number of Israelis travelling outside the country is growing from year to year, as is the case in most Western nations. This, however, reflects a rise in the standard of living rather than a migratory trend. In the period 1950–54, when about 30,000 people left the country each year, the difference between the number of departing and returning residents was an average of 11,000, or 37 per cent. In the period 1975–77, when the number of departing residents each year was between 288,000 and 333,000, the difference between those departing and those returning was an average of 14,000, or between 4 and 5 per cent.[8] Despite an enormous increase in population and in the number of departing residents, the proportion and even the absolute number of emigrants was lower in the early 1970's than in the 1950's.

In order to study emigration from Israel, it is necessary to define the population. While it is possible to ask people directly what their intentions are, this method has limited utility. Some departing Israelis have not given any thought to migrating; others have not yet come to a definite decision. Even Israelis who plan to emigrate will probably feel uncomfortable in admitting their intentions. Experience has shown, moreover, that

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[7] *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* Central Bureau of Statistics, 1978, pp. 126–127.

[8] Z. Rabbi, "Emigration from Israel, 1948–1977," *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,* Central Bureau of Statistics, 1978, No. 5, pp. 83–96.

declarations of intention are not very reliable; many people who declare their intention to emigrate eventually return.[9]

Various scholars have suggested that an emigrant be defined as a person who changes his or her place of residence and stays there one year or more.[10] This definition, which is employed in United Nations reports on migration, was found to be suitable for the present study. Since "Israelis residing abroad" is more precise than *yordim* or "emigrants", the former term will usually be applied in the following discussion.

THE SAMPLE

The analysis in this study is based on two random samples: a group of 378 Israelis residing in the U.S. for 5 years or more, interviewed in 1972, and a group of 188 Israelis residing in the U.S. for one year or more, interviewed in 1977.[11] The samples were derived from lists provided by Israeli consulates, Israeli student organizations (excluding active students), and other sources. Additional names were obtained through a "snowball" effect, i.e., each respondent was asked to provide names of other Israelis known to him. A questionnaire designed for self-administration was mailed to the subjects. The response rate was about 27 per cent in both samples. While the samples may not be representative of the total population of Israelis residing in the U.S. (difficulties were encountered, for example, in reaching cab drivers), they provide some basis for understanding the group.

Sixty-five per cent of all respondents were male; 55 per cent were single when they arrived in the U.S.; 1 per cent were widowed or divorced. At the time of the investigation, 70 per cent were already married; 27 per cent had remained single and 3 per cent were divorced. In the 1977 sample, 29 per cent of the spouses were born in the U.S.; in the 1972 sample the figure was 24 per cent. Eight per cent of the spouses in the 1977 sample were of non-Jewish origin, as compared with 2 per cent in the 1972 sample. The average age of the 1977 sample was lower than that of the 1972 sample: 61 per cent of the 1977 sample were between 25 and 34 years of age; 68 per cent of the 1972 sample were in the 30–49 age group. About one-third of the 1972 sample and about half of the 1977 sample had higher education.

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

[10] W. Petersen, "Migration, Social Aspects," *The International Encyclopedia for the Social Sciences, 10,* (Glencoe, 1968), pp. 186–292.

[11] The 1972 sample is examined in D. Elizur and M. Elizur, *The Long Way Back: Attitudes of Israelis Residing in the U.S. and in France Toward Returning to Israel,* (Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, 1974).

Seventy-four per cent of all respondents were of Ashkenazic background. In terms of religious outlook, in the 1972 sample 29 per cent were Orthodox, 54 per cent traditional, and 18 per cent secular; in the 1977 sample the figures were 16, 56, and 28 per cent, respectively. Sixty per cent of the 1977 sample were born in Israel, while only 40 per cent of the 1972 sample were Israeli-born. This finding supports the contention of many observers that a growing number of *sabras* (Jews born in Israel) are moving abroad.

THE FINDINGS

Motives for Going Abroad

In the past, leaving one's country and going overseas often resulted in a complete break with the country of origin. Technological development in transportation and communication, however, have considerably altered this situation; travel abroad today need not involve a severing of ties. Nonetheless, migration overseas is still a difficult and risky proposition, and requires strong motivation.

The decision to leave one's home country usually ripens gradually and is the result of a variety of considerations. The scholarly literature on the subject tends to place particular stress on economic factors. What, then, are the considerations motivating Israelis to emigrate? Are there discernible differences between the two population samples in this regard?

Table I
Motives for Moving Abroad
(By Percentage)

Content	Sample	Extent of Influence					
		Very Great	Great	Some	Little	None	Total
1. Level of Income	1977	9	7	16	10	58	100
	1972	19	14	19	10	38	100
2. Standard of living	1977	6	7	18	22	47	100
	1972	15	14	21	10	40	100
3. Quality of life	1977	9	14	16	14	48	100
	1972	—	—	—	—	—	—
4. Chances for suitable employment	1977	18	9	9	10	55	100
	1972	23	16	11	9	41	100

5. Chances of acceptance at university	1977	37	6	3	6	48	100
	1972	22	7	5	2	64	100
6. Children's education	1977	1	1	5	3	91	100
	1972	6	7	5	1	81	100
7. Desire to join family	1977	10	3	5	6	76	100
	1972	15	5	7	5	68	100
8. Chances for professional development	1977	30	15	9	9	38	100
	1972*	18	11	8	3	60	100
9. Children's future	1977	2	3	5	4	86	100
	1972	10	7	5	3	76	100
10. Desire to utilize abilities	1977	28	19	9	5	38	100
	1972	20	13	16	7	45	100
11. Professional training	1977	42	10	10	3	34	100
	1972	18	11	8	3	60	100
12. Spouse's wish	1977	18	4	9	6	63	100
	1972	15	6	6	5	69	100
13. Tax policy	1977	15	4	11	9	62	100
	1972	13	5	11	5	66	100
14. Bureaucracy	1977	26	8	10	8	48	100
	1972	17	7	12	8	56	100
15. Desire to see foreign countries	1977	20	11	26	12	30	100
	1972	8	10	21	9	52	100

*In the 1972 sample, the words "and scholarships" were included in this question.

The data presented in Table I indicate that emigration is motivated in the main by considerations related to personal development, i.e., the desire for higher education, the utilization of talent and knowledge, and professional advancement. Additional factors are the quest for suitable employment, higher income, and a higher standard of living. Personal development is emphasized to a greater extent in the 1977 sample than in the 1972 sample; a remarkably lower percentage of the former group claim to have been influenced by direct material considerations. A desire to see foreign countries also seems to be an increasingly important factor; somewhat more than one in five in the 1977 sample mention this factor, while less than one in ten in the 1972 group do so.

Social Contacts

The study examined various patterns of social interaction which may occur among Israelis who have emigrated to the United States. The following directions were observed: ties may be limited to contact with other Israelis; social relations may be established with the local Jewish community; social contact may be established with non-Jews.

The data in Table II indicate that a larger proportion of the 1977 sample maintain contacts with other Israelis (56 per cent as against only 42 per cent in the 1972 sample). About the same proportion of the 1977 and 1972 samples establish contact with local Jews (53 and 57 per cent, respectively). The extent of contact with non-Jews, however, is strikingly different in the two samples; in 1972, about one in five reported having extensive contact, while one in three report having none; in 1977 one in three report having extensive contact and one in ten report having none. The tendency toward assimilation is also indicated by the growing number of intermarriages between Israelis and non-Jews. While only 2 per cent of the 1972 sample reported having non-Jewish spouses, 8 per cent of the 1977 sample do.

Table II
Extent of Social Contact
(By Percentage)

	Sample	Extent of Social Contact				
		Very Much	Much	Little	None	Total
With Israelis	1972	11	31	51	7	100
	1977	17	39	43	2	100
With local Jews	1972	18	39	38	6	100
	1977	13	40	42	5	100
With non-Jews	1972	2	20	50	29	100
	1977	7	26	57	10	100

Table III provides additional data on the social ties established by Israeli emigrants. A positive relationship exists between social contacts established with other Israelis and with local Jews. Similarly, there is a positive relationship between contact with local Jews and with non-Jews. There is, however, no relationship between ties forged with Israelis and with non-Jews. In terms of the relationship between social contact and the intention to return to Israel, there is a clear negative correlation between

ties established with local Jews and non-Jews and the intention to return to Israel. Social contact with Israelis is not significantly related to intention to return to Israel.

Table III
Relation Between Social Contact and Intention to Return to Israel
Coefficients of Weak Monotonicity*
The 1977 Sample, N = 188.
(Decimals Omitted)

	Israelis	Local Jews	Non-Jews	Intention
1. Social contact with Israelis	—	29	01	04
2. Social contact with local Jews	29	—	25	−39
3. Social contact with non-Jews	01	25	—	−36
4. Intention to return to Israel	04	−39	−36	—

*Guttman's weak monotonicity coefficients were used as the measure of correlation. These coefficients vary from +1.00 to −1.00 and indicate the extent to which values of one item increase (decrease) monotonically with increases in another item, without specifying the exact nature of the regression function.

Identity

Emigration to a new country necessitates re-orientation; it involves adjustment to a different language, culture, and way of life. During the initial period of adjustment the emigrant must ask himself: Who am I? How will I present myself to others? With whom shall I associate? In working out answers to these questions, the individual determines his relationship to the new social environment. Future plans will be affected by the identity thus established.

Israelis residing in the United States can assume any of three identities: Israeli, Jewish, American. A set of items dealing with these identities was included in the 1977 study. The data reveal that 99 per cent of the respondents consider themselves to be part of the Jewish people; 96 per cent feel good about their Jewishness; and 92 per cent present themselves to others as Jews. Similarly, 91 per cent of the respondents consider themselves part of Israeli society; 94 per cent feel good about being Israelis; and 81 per cent present themselves as Israelis to others. On the other hand, 35 per cent of the respondents consider themselves to be part of American society; 22 per

cent feel good about being American; and 10 per cent present themselves as Americans to others.

Jewish identity is always tied to other ethnic identities. A relatively strong link may be expected to exist between Jewish and Israeli identity, since the past and values of both are virtually the same. Thus, the majority of the subjects whom Simon Herman[12] studied saw their Jewishness and Israeliness as being interrelated. In the present study each identity was dealt with separately. The relation between the various identities could be analyzed, however, by calculating the correlation coefficients. The relations between Jewish, Israeli, and American identity are presented in Table IV. Jewish and Israeli identity are, indeed, positively related to each other, while American identity is negatively related to both Israeli and Jewish identity.[13]

Table IV
Relations Between Jewish, Israeli, and American Identity
Coefficients of Weak Monotonicity*
The 1977 Sample, N=188
(Decimals Omitted)

	American	Jewish	Israeli	Intention to Return
1. American	—			
2. Jewish	−19	—		
3. Israeli	−47	51	—	
4. Intention to return to Israel	−76	35	72	—

*Guttman's weak monotonicity coefficients were used as the measure of correlation. These coefficients vary from +1.00 to −1.00 and indicate the extent to which values of one item increase (decrease) monotonically with increases in another item, without specifying the exact nature of the regression function.

Intention to Return to Israel

What are the intentions of Israelis residing in the U.S. in terms of returning to Israel?

Data in Table V indicate that 84 per cent of the respondents are in favor of returning. Only a small percentage, however, have clear plans of returning to Israel in the near future.

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[12]S.N. Herman, *Israelis and Jews,* (New York, 1970), p. 44.

[13]This confirms S. N. Herman's finding in *American Students in Israel,* (New York, 1970).

Table V
Intention to Return to Israel
(By Percentage)

	Sample 1977	Sample 1972
Are you thinking of returning to Israel?	(N=184)	(N=372)
Definitely yes	40	37
Probably yes	40	42
Probably no	16	18
Definitely no	4	3
To what extent do you have clear plans about returning to Israel?	(N=183)	(N=362)
Very clear	20	7
Clear	21	15
Not very clear	29	46
Unclear	31	32
If you are thinking of returning to Israel, when do you think this might be?	(N=184)	(N=366)
One year	16	5
2–3 years	18	13
4–5 years	21	5
Hope to return but do not know when	35	56
Not thinking of returning	9	11
Are you for or against returning to Israel?	(N=170)	(N=357)
Very much in favor	33	37
In favor	51	47
Against	13	14
Very much against	3	1

The relation between expressed intention to return to Israel and other variables was examined. One would expect that the considerations involved in the decision to return to Israel after living abroad would be somewhat similar to those involved in the initial decision to leave. The passage of time, however, will have brought about changes: people have grown older; singles may have married (frequently to spouses born in the host country); families

may have increased in size; and social and professional ties have probably been established. These factors will have an impact on the decision.

As seen in Table VI, factors which encourage respondents to return to Israel include love for the homeland, the desire to live in a Jewish society, the wish to join other family members, and the children's education and future. The latter two considerations are particularly important for the 1977 sample. Factors deterring the respondents from returning to Israel are bureaucracy, tax policy, and level of income.

Data in Table VII indicate that the perception and presentation of oneself as an Israeli are positively related to the intention to return to Israel. On the other hand, the perception and presentation of oneself as an American are negatively related to the intention to return. The perceived attitudes of referents, especially those of spouses and close friends, have a strong impact on the decision to return. Opportunities for obtaining suitable work in Israel positively influence the decision. Time spent abroad has a negative impact. Use of Hebrew in the home is positively related to the intention to return.

Religious observance is positively (coefficient of 0.24) related to the intention to return to Israel. The majority of *sabras* of Western origin have definite plans to return, while the majority of the other groups do not.

Some scholars maintain that dissatisfaction and frustration are basic determinants of the decision to migrate.[14] Thus it is of interest to compare the attitudes of respondents toward various aspects of life in Israel and in the U.S., and to analyze the relations between satisfaction and the intention to return to Israel.

Table VIII indicates that relatively more respondents are satisfied with their work and general situation in the United States than in Israel. It is their social life in the U.S. which compares unfavorably with that in Israel. Analysis of the relationship between the various aspects of satisfaction shows that satisfaction with the general situation is closely tied to work satisfaction in the U.S. and social satisfaction in Israel.

From Table IX it is clear that the intention to return to Israel is positively related to satisfaction in Israel and dissatisfaction in the United States.

CONCLUSION

The literature on migration stresses the importance of economic factors in the decision to go abroad. The sample of Israelis who were examined in this study, however, placed greater stress on factors related to personal development—opportunities for higher education, professional training,

[14]S.N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants*, (London, 1954).

Table VI
Considerations for Returning to Israel
(By Percentage)

Content	Sample	Extent of Attraction					
		Attracts very much	Attracts	Neither attracts nor deters	Deters	Deters very much	Total
1. Love for homeland	1977	61	25	14	—	—	100
	1972	60	33	6	—	—	100
2. Wish to join the family	1977	50	25	23	—	2	100
	1972	35	32	28	3	2	100
3. Children's education	1977	47	28	21	2	1	100
	1972	31	25	34	7	2	100
4. Desire to live in Jewish society	1977	42	34	22	1	1	100
	1972	46	34	18	1	1	100
5. Children's future	1977	42	25	24	3	5	100
	1972	37	26	31	2	4	100
6. Spouse's wish	1977	14	17	48	9	11	100
	1972	13	21	44	12	10	100
7. Quality of life	1977	10	27	27	17	19	100
	1972	—	—	—	—	—	—
8. Utilize ability and knowledge	1977	10	14	45	16	15	100
	1972	6	13	60	12	9	100
9. Chances for suitable employment	1977	6	15	41	18	19	100
	1972	2	7	46	27	17	100
10. Chances for professional development	1977	5	9	46	20	20	100
	1972	2	8	63	14	14	100
11. Standard of living	1977	2	3	58	24	13	100
	1972	3	4	46	31	16	100
12. Professional training	1977	1	2	56	25	16	100
	1972	1	2	76	13	7	100
13. Level of income	1977	—	1	46	34	19	100
	1972	2	1	41	35	21	100
14. Tax policy	1977	—	—	32	28	39	100
	1972	1	1	40	31	28	100
15. Bureaucracy	1977	—	1	19	29	49	100
	1972	1	—	38	29	32	100

Table VII
Items Related with the Intention to Return to Israel
Coefficients of weak monotonicity*
(Decimals Omitted)

	Sample	
	1977	1972
1. *Identity*		
Considers himself part of Israeli society	72	78
Presents himself as Israeli	70	—
Considers himself part of American society	−76	—
Presents himself as American	−79	—
Considers himself part of the Jewish people	35	—
2. *Attitudes of referents*		
Family considers him to be an Israeli	55	—
Colleagues consider him to be an Israeli	65	—
Friends consider him to be an Israeli	71	—
Spouse is in favor of returning to Israel	88	66
3. *Hebrew*		
Speaks Hebrew at home	69	38
Listens to Hebrew broadcasts	52	20
Reads Israeli newspapers	55	43
4. *Considerations related to children and family*		
Future of children attracts to return	72	57
Education of children attracts to return	63	45
Wish of spouse attracts to return	69	64
Wish to join the family attracts to return	60	46
Chances of getting suitable work attracts to return	55	29
Children attending Jewish school	52	—
Spouse non-Jewish	−54	—
5. *Dissatisfaction abroad*		
Not feeling at home	84	50
Dissatisfaction with social life	57	—
Dissatisfaction with general conditions	37	—
6. *Background characteristics*		
Time spent abroad	−67	—
Income	−48	—

*Guttman's weak monotonicity coefficients were used as the measure of correlation. These coefficients vary from +1.00 to −1.00 and indicate the extent to which values of one item increase (decrease) monotonically with increases in another item, without specifying the exact nature of the regression function.

Table VIII
Satisfaction in the US and in Israel
(By Percentage)

Content	Sample	In the US: Very satisfied	Satisfied	Not so satisfied	Not satisfied	Total	In Israel: Very satisfied	Satisfied	Not so satisfied	Not satisfied	Total
Work	1977	45	41	9	5	100	27	38	24	12	100
	1972	35	54	9	2	100	18	39	21	22	100
General situation	1977	30	51	18	1	100	22	42	24	13	100
	1972	23	58	15	3	100	14	34	30	21	100
Children's education	1977	28	49	15	8	100	26	52	13	10	100
	1972	35	59	13	3	100	49	40	6	5	100
Social life	1977	16	45	29	9	100	36	48	10	7	100
	1972	10	43	31	16	100	42	49	6	3	100

Table IX
Relations between Satisfaction and Intention to Return to Israel
Coefficients of weak monotonicity*
1977 Sample, N = 188
(Decimals Omitted)

Area of Satisfaction	Satisfaction in the US					Satisfaction in Israel				
	Work	General situation	Children's education	Social life	Intention to return	Work	General situation	Children's education	Social life	Intention to return
1. Work	—					—				
2. General situation	80	—				34	—			
3. Children's education	62	48	—			75	55	—		
4. Social life	37	52	62	—		42	58	25	—	
5. Intention to return	−26	−37	−33	−52	—	40	31	73	29	—

*Guttman's weak monotonicity coefficients were used as the measure of correlation. These coefficients vary from +1.00 to −1.00 and indicate the extent to which values of one item increase (decrease) monotonically with increases in another item, without specifying the exact nature of the regression function.

and the utilization of talent, as well as the desire to experience life in other countries. Thus, the motives of Israelis coming to the United States are more of a pull than a push nature. A number of scholars have argued that if migration is caused by pull factors, the chance of return migration is likely to be high.[15]

In the past, emigration from Israel was stigmatized as unpatriotic and evoked negative responses. Recently, however, Israeli authorities have changed their approach. Having become aware that Israelis residing abroad constitute a potential pool of immigrants, they have employed various means to encourage them to return. Assistance in finding employment and housing, customs reductions, and loans for travel expenses are among the benefits to which returning Israelis are entitled. Judging by the data in this study, it would appear wise for Israeli authorities not to limit their efforts to providing support for those Israelis who have made a decision to return. Israelis residing abroad should be encouraged to maintain their Israeli and Jewish identities—to read Israeli newspapers, listen to Hebrew-language broadcasts, and send their children to Jewish schools. While this cannot guarantee that Israeli emigrants will feel the need to return to Israel, it may considerably increase the chances.

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[15]Everett S. Lee, "A Theory of Migration," *Demography*, 1966, pp. 47–57, and Samuel, *loc. cit.*

Jewish Communal Services: Programs and Finances

JEWISH FEDERATIONS, through their annual campaigns and endowment funds, provide the major source of contributed support for Jewish overseas and domestic services. Other important sources of income for Jewish services are public funds, service payments, and United Way grants.

The classification of services may be based on geography (local, national, or overseas), may reflect the major program areas of Jewish agencies (community centers, refugee services, welfare and health services, community relations, Jewish education, vocational training, etc.), or may cut across agencies where more than one of them provides aspects of specific services.

The United Jewish Appeal (UJA) provides support for the United Israel Appeal (UIA), the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), and the New York Association for New Americans (NYANA). The Jewish Agency is the operational agency for UIA and Keren Hayesod programs, which include assistance for immigration, agricultural settlement, welfare services, higher education, and youth *aliyah*. JDC programs in various countries, including Israel, are based almost completely on funds raised in the United States. JDC provides subventions to ORT for vocational education, which are supplemented by membership campaigns in the U.S. and by governmental support abroad. NYANA, which resettles refugees in the New York City area, is financed by UJA; parallel programs in other communities are financed directly by local federations.

Among other important overseas agencies are the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), Hadassah, the National Committee for Labor Israel, the America-Israel Cultural Foundation, and the Jewish National Fund.

Those agencies that specialize in community relations—the American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Congress, Jewish Labor Committee, Jewish War Veterans, and National Conference on Soviet Jewry—are the main beneficiaries of federation support on the national level. They, and the local community relations councils that exist in more than 100 cities, are joined together in the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council.

The national religious agencies include the major seminaries and congregational bodies of the three religious wings. Some Orthodox *yeshivot* in the major cities receive support from local federations.

The Joint Cultural Appeal, administered by the National Foundation for Jewish Culture, encompasses nine agencies. There are also secular institutions of higher learning (Brandeis, Dropsie, and Herzliah), and a number of research and scholarly groups which receive financial assistance from federations. Major national youth

groups include Hillel, the B'nai B'rith Youth Organization, and the North American Jewish Students Appeal.

National agencies which serve local programs are the National Jewish Welfare Board (serving community centers), the American Association for Jewish Education, and the National Association of Jewish Vocational Services.

Local programs supported by federations with United Way aid are community centers, family and children's services, hospitals, care for the aged, and (to a nominal extent) vocational services. Federations receive no United Way support for Jewish education, refugee aid, and local community relations.

Amounts Raised

During the 1975–78 period, when the cost of living rose by 21 per cent, the amount raised annually in support of Jewish domestic and overseas needs was between $460 million and $475 million. The sale of Israel Bonds in the United States amounted to $267 million in 1977, and $296 million in 1978. Over $32.3 million in Israel Bonds was turned over to UJA in 1977 in partial payment of federation campaign pledges; in 1978 the figure was over $32.0 million.

Fund Distribution

Federation allocations continued to be directed mainly to UJA—69 per cent in 1976; 66 per cent in 1977; and 64 per cent in 1978. These levels were higher than in most years prior to 1967. Outside of New York City, allocations for refugee aid rose to 2.3 per cent in 1976, and were continuing to rise. Other national and overseas agencies received a relatively stable annual share of about 3 per cent.

Federation allocations for local needs were about 26 per cent in 1976, 28 per cent (estimated) in 1977, and 30 per cent (estimated) in 1978. These levels were higher than those in the preceding decade, but were lower than those in the 1958–66 period.

About one quarter of federation allocations went for Jewish education in the United States. Funds for Jewish education in other countries were provided to the Jewish Agency, mainly through global Keren Hayesod campaigns.

Total allocations by federations for all local services amounted to $112 million in 1977. They were supplemented by $27 million in United Way funds earmarked for those Jewish services eligible for such support.

Five-Year Trend

In the 1972–76 period the greatest increase in aid was in the area of refugee care, which rose ninefold, from $744,000 to $6,704,000 (in 92 communities). During the same period, most other allocations rose from 40 to 50 per cent. Overall allocations by federations rose by 64 per cent, while United Way grants increased by only 18 per cent.

S. P. GOLDBERG

TABLE 1. AMOUNTS RAISED IN CENTRAL JEWISH COMMUNITY CAMPAIGNS
(Estimates in Millions of Dollars)

Year	*Amounts Raised*	*Consumer Price Index 1975 = 100.0%*
1974	$660	—
1975	475	100.0
1976	460	105.8
1977*	465	112.6
1978*	475	121.2

*Estimates based on incomplete reports.

TABLE 2.

SALES OF STATE OF ISRAEL BONDS, 1974–1978

(In Thousands of Dollars)

Year	*Total Cash Sales*	*Sales In U.S.*	*Sales Abroad*
1974	$265,477	$204,257	$61,220
1975	277,311*	226,217	51,094
1976	311,410*	241,690	69,720
1977	331,571*	267,094	64,477
1978	369,801*	295,690	74,111

*Includes sales of five-year and other Israel notes, as listed below.

SALES OF ISRAEL NOTES

(In Thousands of Dollars)

1975(initiation)	$ 20,000	$19,000	$ 1,000
1976	56,500	40,000	16,500
1977	70,500	57,000	13,500
1978	121,280	95,405	25,875

TOTAL SALES AND REDEMPTIONS, 1951–1978

Global sales from 1951 through 1978	$4,220 million
Redemptions 1951 through 1978 . .	1,460 million
Types of Redemptions:	
Tourism	239 million
Jewish Agency	291 million
Other Agencies	225 million
Investments in Israel	190 million
Other	515 million

TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS RAISED TO FIELDS OF SERVICE
(Estimates in Thousands of Dollars)

	1976	1975	*Total* 1974	1973	1972
TOTAL AMOUNT BUDGETED TO BENEFICIARIES[c, d]	$385,902	$399,498	$584,530	$332,807	$322,086
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Overseas Agencies	269,257	289,356	485,115	248,577	244,321
%	69.8	72.4	83.0	74.7	75.9
United Jewish Appeal	265,883	286,108	481,737	245,722	240,562
%	68.9	71.6	82.4	73.8	74.7
Other Overseas	3,374	3,248	3,378	2,855	3,759
%	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.9	1.2
Local Refugee Care[f]	7,015	5,595	3,245	1,296	758
%	1.8	1.4	0.6	0.4	0.2
National Agencies	8,083	8,066	8,101	6,886	6,830
%	2.1	2.0	1.4	2.1	2.1
Community Relations	3,918	3,952	4,144	3,245	3,235
%	1.0	1.0	0.7	1.0	1.0
Health & Welfare	20	18	18	18	27
%	#	#	#	#	#
Cultural	1,315	1,370	1,428	1,241	1,167
%	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.4
Religious	288	303	347	276	374
%	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Service Agencies	2,542	2,423	2,164	2,106	2,027
%	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.6
Local Operating Needs	98,313	92,692	84,147	72,966	67,622
%	25.5	23.2	14.4	21.9	21.0
Local Capital Needs	3,234	3,789	3,919	3,079	2,552
%	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.8

[a] Based upon communities which are currently CJF members and some smaller cities which are not CJF members but which had been included in the base group of communities used in 1948 when this statistical series was started. Minor differences in amounts and percentages due to rounding. United Fund support *excluded* from this table but *included* in Tables 5,6.

[b] Figures for New York include the United Jewish Appeal of Greater New York and Federation of Jewish Philanthropies. Local refugee costs in New York City are borne by NYANA, a direct beneficiary of the UJA nationally. Most overseas and domestic agencies, which are normally included in Welfare Funds in other cities, conduct their own campaigns in New York. The New York UJA included the following beneficiaries (in addition to the National UJA): HIAS and National Jewish Welfare Board. Data for New York UJA are based on estimates of distribution of annual campaign proceeds, regardless of year in which cash is received.

[c] The difference between this amount and "total raised" in Table I represents mainly "shrinkage" allowance for non-payment of pledges, campaign and administrative expenses, elimination of duplicating multiple city gifts and contingency or other reserves.

[d] Includes small undistributed amounts in "total" and "other cities" columns.

[e] Based on data published in CJF Budget Digests.

[f] NYANA is included in UJA totals: ($0.6 million in 1972; $0.9 million in 1973; $2.3 million in 1974; $4.4 million in 1975; $6.1 million in 1976).

Less than .05 of one per cent.

(INCLUDING ISRAEL EMERGENCY FUND) BY JEWISH FEDERATIONS[a]

(Estimates in Thousands of Dollars)

New York City[b]					*Other Cities*				
1976	*1975*	*1974*	*1973*	*1972*	*1976*	*1975*	*1974*	*1973*	*1972*
$76,754	$80,264	$130,351	$80,725	$79,096	$309,148	$319,234	$454,179	$252,082	$242,990
100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
50,500	55,000	107,000	58,718	58,638	218,757	234,356	378,115	189,859	185,683
65.8	68.5	82.1	72.7	74.1	70.7	73.4	83.3	75.4	76.4
49,400	54,000	106,000	58,000	58,000	216,483	232,108	375,737	187,722	182,562
64.4	67.3	81.3	71.8	73.3	70.0	72.7	82.7	74.5	75.1
1,100	1,000	1,000	718	638	2,274	2,248	2,378	2,137	3,121
1.4	1.2	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.9	1.3
—	—	—	—	—	7,015	5,595	3,245	1,296	758
—	—	—	—	—	2.3	1.8	0.7	0.5	0.3
1,046[c]	960[c]	726[c]	816[c]	721	7,037	7,016	7,375	6,070	6,109
1.4	1.2	0.5	1.0	0.9	2.3	2.2	1.6	2.4	2.5
—	—	—	—	—	3,918	3,952	4,144	3,245	3,235
—	—	—	—	—	1.3	1.2	0.9	1.3	1.3
—	—	—	—	—	20	18	18	18	27
—	—	—	—	—	#	#	#	#	#
—	—	—	—	—	1,315	1,370	1,428	1,241	1,167
—	—	—	—	—	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5
—	—	—	—	—	288	303	347	276	374
—	—	—	—	—	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
1,046[c]	960[c]	726[c]	816[c]	721	1,496	1,463	1,438	1,290	1,306
1.4	1.2	0.5	1.0	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.5
25,208	24,304	22,625	21,191	19,737	73,105	68,388	61,522	51,775	47,885
32.8	30.3	17.4	26.3	25.0	23.7	21.4	13.5	20.5	19.7
—	—	—	—	—	3,234	3,789	3,919	3,079	2,552
—	—	—	—	—	1.0	1.2	0.9	1.2	1.1

TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERATION AND UNITED FUND ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL JEWISH SERVICES, 1975–1977

(Estimates in Millions of Dollars)

	Total			New York City			Other Cities		
	1975	1976	1977	1975	1976	1977	1975	1976	1977
Fields Receiving United Way Support									
Centers, Camps, Related Programs	$32.6	$35.0	$37.2	$7.7	$8.2	$8.2	$24.9	$26.8	$29.0
Family and Children's Services	24.9	26.3	27.6	6.7	7.0	7.1	18.2	19.3	20.5
Hospitals, Health	11.6	11.5	11.3	5.0	5.0	4.7	6.6	6.5	6.6
Aged	11.8	12.0	12.8	1.8	2.0	2.0	10.0	10.0	10.8
Federation Administration (United Way Funds Only)	0.9	0.9	1.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.7
Sub-Total	$81.8	$85.7	$90.0	$21.5	$22.5	$22.4	$60.3	$63.2	$ 67.6
Less: Provided by United Funds	25.5	26.6	27.2	2.6	2.7	3.3	22.9	23.9	23.9
Provided by Federations	56.3	59.1	62.8	18.9	19.8	19.1	37.4	39.3	43.7
Fields Receiving Only Federation Support									
Employment Services	4.4	4.6	4.7	1.2	1.1	1.0	3.2	3.5	3.7
Jewish Education	19.0	20.5	22.5	2.3	2.5	2.8	16.7	18.0	19.7
Refugee Aid	5.5[a]	6.8[a]	8.0[a]	(a)	(a)	(a)	5.5	6.8	8.0
Community Relations	3.2[b]	3.3[b]	3.5[b]	(b)	(b)	(b)	3.2	3.3	3.5
Hillel	2.2	2.3	2.4	0.1	0.1	—	2.1	2.2	2.4
Other College Youth	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.5	0.7
Local Capital	3.8[c]	3.2[c]	3.5[c]	(c)	(c)	(c)	3.8	3.2	3.5
Other	2.9	3.3	3.5	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.8	1.9
Sub-Total	$41.6	$44.6	$48.9	$5.1	$5.3	$5.5	$36.5	$39.3	$43.4
TOTAL	$123.4	$130.3	$138.9	$26.6	$27.8	$27.9	$96.8	$102.5	$111.0
Provided by Federations[e]	97.9	103.7	111.7	24.0	25.1	24.6	73.9	78.6	87.1
Provided by United Funds[d]	25.5	26.6	27.2	2.6	2.7	3.3	22.9	23.9	23.9
TOTAL[e]	$123.4	$130.3	$138.9	$26.6	$27.8	$27.9	$96.8	$102.5	$111.0

[e] These totals are based on 110 communities: extrapolations in Table 3 based on all communities yield totals about $4 million higher.

[a] Funds provided annually by NYANA, financed by UJA: $4.4 million in 1975 and $6.1 million in 1976.

[b] Provided mainly by national agencies.

[c] Most capital campaigns are excluded because they are conducted apart from annual campaigns; United Funds in non-federated cities are also excluded.

[d] Includes in NYC grants by Greater NY Fund and United Hospital Fund to federated agencies.

[e] Data for other cities in this table are understated from $1–$3 million annually compared with total estimates in Table 3 because functional distributions are not available in all smaller cities.

TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERATION ALLOCATIONS INCLUDING UNITED WAY FUNDS FOR LOCAL SERVICES IN 110 COMMUNITIES—1975, 1976

(Excluding New York City)

	1976			1975			
	Amount	*% of Total*	*% of Total Fed. Alloc.*	*Amount*	*% of Total*	*% of Total Fed. Alloc.*	*% Rise*
Family & Children's Service	$19,271,608	19.4		$18,242,625	19.6		5.6
Aged Care	9,952,533	10.0		10,000,609	10.8		(0.5)
Health	6,513,825	6.6		6,561,796	7.1		(0.7)
Centers, Camps, and Related Programs	26,782,479	27.0		24,897,194	26.8		7.6
Local and Regional Hillel	2,238,620	2.3		2,128,495	2.3		5.2
Other College Youth Programs	496,448	.5		506,649	.5		(2.0)
Employment and Guidance	3,476,451	3.5	4.6	3,212,904	3.5	4.6	8.2
Jewish Education	18,018,778	18.1	23.9	16,694,645	17.9	23.8	7.9
Refugee Care	6,809,345	6.9	9.0	5,478,034	5.9	7.8	24.3
Community Relations	3,325,749	3.3	4.4	3,199,860	3.4	4.6	3.9
Other	1,816,802	1.8		1,481,510	1.6		22.6
United Way to Federation for Local Administration	638,285	.6		570,395	.6		11.9
Total	$99,340,923	100.0		$92,974,716	100.0		
Sources of Income							
Federations	$75,469,446	76.0		$70,035,194	75.3		
United Way	23,871,477	24.0		22,939,522	24.7		

TABLE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERATION ALLOCATIONS* FOR LOCAL SERVICES IN 92 COMMUNITIES—1972, 1976

	1972		1976		Index of Change
	Amount	*%*	*Amount*	*%*	*1972=100%*
Family Service	$13,839,279	21.5	$18,831,247	19.5	136.1
Aged Care	6,846,895	10.6	9,695,821	10.0	141.6
Health	6,133,299	9.5	6,513,175	6.7	106.2
Centers, Camps, Youth Services	19,765,721	30.6	28,258,034	29.2	143.0
Employment and Guidance	2,365,336	3.7	3,475,451	3.6	146.9
Jewish Education**	11,319,268	17.5	17,709,187	18.3	156.5
		(25.3)		(24.2)	
Refugee Care	744,306	1.1	6,703,953	6.9	900.7
Community Relations	2,032,040	3.2	3,276,058	3.4	161.2
Other	954,013	1.5	1,723,099	1.8	180.6
United Way to Federation for Local Administration #	533,583	0.8	618,289	0.6	115.9
Total	$64,533,740	100.0	$96,804,314	100.0	150.0
Sources of Income					
Federation	$44,704,410	69.3	$73,308,134	75.7	164.0
United Way	19,829,330	30.7	23,496,180	24.3	118.5

* Includes both federations and United Funds; excludes New York City.

** Figures within parentheses are percentages of Jewish Education allocations to total federation allocations.

Administrative costs of federations are not segregated between local and non-local programs.

Demographic

Jewish Population in the United States, 1979

THE ESTIMATE of the United States "Jewish Population"* for 1979 is 5,860,900, a modest increase over the previous year's figure of 5,780,960. The South and West comprise 30.2 per cent of the total, as compared to 29.1 in 1978 and 27.8 in 1977. Twenty-three of the 30 states in these regions reported increases in 1979; those reporting significant gains included Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Hawaii. The Northeast and Northcentral states represent 69.8 per cent of the total Jewish population, as compared to 70.9 and 72.2 in 1978 and 1977, respectively. Of the 21 states (including the District of Columbia) in these regions, 10 noted population increases. It is important to bear in mind that in situations of shifting population, there is a tendency for growing communities to report changes faster than communities which are experiencing population loss.

Two factors combine to make the total estimate problematic. The extent of the shift to the "sun-belt" states may not yet be fully reported. On the other hand, the New York City area estimate is, in all likelihood, overstated. The figure of 1,228,000 for the city proper is based on the 1970 National Jewish Population Study. Unofficial estimates by the New York Department of City Planning show a 13.5 per cent drop in the city's white population between 1970 and 1977. An extrapolation of this figure to 1979 could reduce the Jewish population figure for New York City to around 1,000,000. The extent to which Jews have shifted their residences to New York City's suburbs and to areas outside Greater New York is unknown. The New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies is hoping to sponsor a study which will shed light on this manner.

The community estimates listed in Table 3 are provided primarily by local Jewish federations. The estimates cover the fund-raising and service areas of community federations, which generally include the city itself and the more densely populated surrounding areas. This year information on the geographic areas covered by estimates was requested. Several communities previously listed separately are now included in the estimates of nearby larger cities. Details are found in Table 3.

*Represents the number of individuals in households in which one or more Jews reside, and therefore includes non-Jews living in such households as a result of intermarriage, etc. For a discussion of this, see AJYB, 1974–75, Vol. 75, pp. 296–297.

Estimates for non-federated communities are based on returned questionnaires from local synagogues. An asterisk precedes those cities which submitted estimates in either 1978 or 1979.

National, regional, and state totals are derived by summing the local estimates. The accuracy of these estimates depends on the methods used in obtaining them. Some communities have recently completed population studies, while others employ lists of "known" Jews, taking into consideration the unknown factor. State totals, reported in Table 1, exclude duplicate listings and out-of-state figures where a community extends across state boundaries. Cities with less than 100 Jews (not shown in Table 3) are also included.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1. JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1979

State	Estimated Jewish Population	Total Population*	Estimated Jewish Per Cent Of Total
Alabama	8,805	3,742,000	0.2
Alaska	920	403,000	0.2
Arizona	39,285	2,354,000	1.7
Arkansas	3,395	2,186,000	0.2
California	698,995	22,294,000	3.1
Colorado	41,765	2,670,000	1.6
Connecticut	101,375	3,099,000	3.3
Delaware	10,000	583,000	1.7
District of Columbia	40,000	674,000	5.9
Florida	435,580	8,594,000	5.1
Georgia	33,610	5,084,000	0.7
Hawaii	5,625	897,000	0.6
Idaho	505	878,000	0.1
Illinois	267,525	11,243,000	2.4
Indiana	23,690	5,374,000	0.4
Iowa	8,735	2,896,000	0.3
Kansas	10,755	2,348,000	0.5
Kentucky	11,585	3,498,000	0.3
Louisiana	16,080	3,966,000	0.4
Maine	7,970	1,091,000	0.7
Maryland	185,760	4,143,000	4.5
Massachusetts	250,060	5,774,000	4.3
Michigan	90,195	9,189,000	1.0
Minnesota	33,980	4,008,000	0.8
Mississippi	3,395	2,404,000	0.1
Missouri	73,335	4,860,000	1.5
Montana	645	785,000	0.1
Nebraska	7,905	1,565,000	0.5
Nevada	14,700	660,000	2.2
New Hampshire	5,190	871,000	0.6
New Jersey	440,915	7,327,000	6.0
New Mexico	5,685	1,212,000	0.5
New York	2,141,745	17,748,000	12.1

State	Estimated Jewish Population	Total Population*	Estimated Jewish Per Cent Of Total
North Carolina	13,620	5,577,000	0.2
North Dakota	1,085	652,000	0.2
Ohio	151,870	10,749,000	1.4
Oklahoma	6,040	2,880,000	0.2
Oregon	10,835	2,444,000	0.4
Pennsylvania	421,900	11,750,000	3.6
Rhode Island	22,000	935,000	2.4
South Carolina	8,240	2,918,000	0.3
South Dakota	595	690,000	0.1
Tennessee	17,230	4,357,000	0.4
Texas	71,515	13,014,000	0.5
Utah	2,300	1,307,000	0.2
Vermont	2,465	487,000	0.5
Virginia	58,685	5,148,000	1.1
Washington	18,385	3,774,000	0.5
West Virginia	4,090	1,860,000	0.2
Wisconsin	30,025	4,679,000	0.6
Wyoming	310	424,000	0.1
U.S. TOTAL	5,860,900	218,059,000	2.7

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

*July 1, 1978, resident population. Total population, including Armed Forces overseas, was 218,548,000. Total civilian population was 216,432,000. (Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P.25, No. 799 & No. 809.)

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. JEWISH POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1979

Region	*Total Population*	*Per Cent Distribution*	*Jewish Population*	*Per Cent Distribution*
Northeast:	49,081,000	22.5	3,393,620	57.9
New England	12,256,000	5.6	389,060	6.6
Middle Atlantic	36,825,000	16.9	3,004,560	51.3
North Central:	58,251,000	26.7	699,695	11.9
East North Central	41,233,000	18.9	563,305	9.6
West North Central	17,018,000	7.8	136,390	2.3
South:	70,626,000	32.4	927,630	15.8
South Atlantic	34,579,000	15.9	789,585	13.5
East South Central	14,001,000	6.4	41,015	0.7
West South Central	22,046,000	10.1	97,030	1.7
West:	40,100,000	18.4	839,955	14.3
Mountain	10,289,000	4.7	105,195	1.8
Pacific	29,811,000	13.7	734,760	12.5
TOTALS	218,059,000	100.0	5,860,900	100.0

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

TABLE 3. COMMUNITIES WITH JEWISH POPULATIONS OF 100 OR MORE, 1979 (ESTIMATED)

State and City	Jewish Population
ALABAMA	
*Anniston	100
*Birmingham	4,000
*Dothan	205
*Gadsden	180
Huntsville	650
*Mobile	1,200
*Montgomery	1,625
Selma	210
Tri-Cities[a]	120
Tuscaloosa	315
ALASKA	
*Anchorage	600
*Fairbanks	210
ARIZONA	
*Phoenix	29,000
*Tucson	10,000
ARKANSAS	
*Fayetteville	120
*Ft. Smith	160
Hot Springs (incl. in Little Rock)	
*Little Rock	1,820
*Pine Bluff	175
Southeast Arkansas[b]	140
Wynne-Forest City	110
CALIFORNIA	
*Alameda & Contra Costa Counties	28,000
Antelope Valley	375
Bakersfield (incl. in Kern County)	
El Centro	125
Elsinore	250
*Eureka	250
Fontana	165
*Fresno	2,500
Kern County	850
Lancaster (incl. in Antelope Valley)	
*Long Beach	12,500
*Los Angeles Metropolitan Area	455,000
Merced	100
Modesto	260
*Monterey	1,500
*Oakland (incl. in Alameda & Contra Costa Counties)	
Ontario (incl. in Pomona Valley)	
*Orange County	40,000
*Palm Springs	4,700
*Pasadena (also incl. in Los Angeles Metropolitan Area)	2,000
*Petaluma	800
*Pomona Valley[c]	3,500
*Riverside	1,200
*Sacramento	5,700
*Salinas	350
San Bernardino	1,900
*San Diego	26,500
*San Francisco	75,000
*San Jose	14,500
*San Luis Obispo	450
*San Pedro	300
*Santa Barbara	3,800
*Santa Cruz	1,000
*Santa Maria	200
Santa Monica	8,000
*Santa Rosa	750
Stockton	1,050
*Sun City	800
Tulare and Kings County (incl. in Fresno)	
Vallejo	400
Ventura County	5,000
COLORADO	
*Colorado Springs	1,000
*Denver	40,000
Pueblo	375
CONNECTICUT	
*Bridgeport	17,000
Bristol	250
Colchester	525
*Danbury (incl. New Milford)	3,500
*Greenwich	2,200
*Hartford (incl. New Britain)	23,500
Lebanon	175
Lower Middlesex County[d]	125
Manchester (incl. in Hartford)	
*Meriden	1,400
*Middletown	1,300
Milford (incl. in New Haven)	
*Moodus	150
*New Haven	20,000
*New London	4,500
Newtown (incl. in Danbury)	
*Norwalk	4,000
*Norwich	2,500
Putnam	110
Rockville (incl. in Hartford)	
*Stamford	12,000
Torrington	400
*Valley Area[e]	700
Wallingford	440

State and City	Jewish Population
*Waterbury	3,200
Westport	2,800
*Willimantic	400
Winsted	110
DELAWARE	
*Wilmington (incl. rest of state)	10,000
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	
*Greater Washington[1]	160,000
FLORIDA	
*Brevard County	2,250
*Daytona Beach	1,800
*Fort Lauderdale	60,000
Fort Myers	300
Fort Pierce	270
*Gainesville	1,000
*Hollywood	55,000
*Jacksonville	6,000
Key West	170
*Lakeland	800
Lehigh Acres	125
*Miami	225,000
*Orlando	12,000
*Palm Beach County	45,000
*Pensacola	725
Port Charlotte	150
*Sarasota	5,800
St. Augustine	100
*St. Petersburg (incl. Clearwater)	10,000
*Tallahassee	1,000
*Tampa	8,000
GEORGIA	
Albany	525
*Athens	250
*Atlanta	25,000
*Augusta	1,500
Brunswick	120
*Columbus	1,000
Dalton	235
Fitzgerald-Cordele	125
Macon	785
*Savannah	2,600
*Valdosta	145
HAWAII	
*Hilo	100
*Honolulu	5,000
*Kona	100
*Maui	200
IDAHO	
Boise	120
ILLINOIS	
Aurora	400
*Bloomington	125
*Champaign-Urbana	1,200
*Chicago Metropolitan Area	253,000
Danville	240
Decatur	450
East St. Louis (incl. in So. Ill.)	
Elgin	700
*Galesburg (incl. in Peoria)	
*Joliet	800
*Kankakee	260
*Peoria	2,000
Quad Cities[2]	3,000
Quincy	200
Rock Island (incl. in Quad Cities)	
*Rockford	1,025
*Southern Illinois[3]	1,200
*Springfield	1,500
Sterling-Dixon	110
*Waukegan	1,200
INDIANA	
Anderson	105
Bloomington	300
*Elkhart	160
*Evansville	1,200
*Ft. Wayne	1,350
*Gary (incl. in Northwest Indiana-Calumet Region)	
*Indianapolis	11,000
Lafayette	600
Marion	170
Michigan City	400
Muncie	175
*Northwest Indiana-Calumet Region[4]	4,500
*Richmond	110
Shelbyville	140
*South Bend	2,400
*Terre Haute	450
IOWA	
Cedar Rapids	330
Council Bluffs	245
Davenport (incl. in Quad Cities, Ill.)	
*Des Moines	3,500
Dubuque	105
Fort Dodge	115
*Iowa City	750
Mason City	110
Muscatine	120
Ottumwa	150
*Sioux City	1,070
Waterloo	435
KANSAS	
Topeka	500
*Wichita	1,200
KENTUCKY	
*Lexington	1,400

State and City	Jewish Population
*Louisville	9,200
Paducah	175
LOUISIANA	
*Alexandria	760
*Baton Rouge	1,150
Lafayette	600
*Lake Charles	250
*Monroe	290
*New Orleans	10,600
*Shreveport	1,600
MAINE	
Augusta	215
*Bangor	1,500
Biddeford-Saco	375
Calais	135
*Lewiston-Auburn	1,100
*Portland	3,500
*Waterville	300
MARYLAND	
*Annapolis	2,000
*Baltimore	92,000
*Cumberland	265
Easton Park Area	100
Frederick	400
*Hagerstown	275
Hartford County	420
*Montgomery County[1]	70,000
*Prince Georges County[1]	20,000
*Salisbury	300
MASSACHUSETTS	
*Amherst	750
*Athol	110
*Attleboro	200
*Beverly	1,000
*Boston (incl. Brockton)	170,000
*Brockton	5,200
*Fall River	1,815
*Fitchburg	300
*Framingham	16,000
*Gardner	100
*Gloucester	400
Great Barrington	105
Greenfield	250
*Haverhill	1,600
Holyoke	1,100
*Hyannis	1,200
*Lawrence	2,550
*Leominster	750
Lowell	2,000
*Lynn (incl. Peabody)	19,000
Medway (incl. in Framingham)	
Milford (incl. in Framingham)	
Mills (incl. in Framingham)	
*New Bedford	3,100
Newburyport	280
North Berkshire	675
Northampton	350
*Peabody	2,600
*Pittsfield	1,685
*Plymouth	500
*Salem	1,150
Southbridge	105
*Springfield	11,000
Taunton	1,200
Webster	125
*Worcester	10,000
MICHIGAN	
*Ann Arbor (incl. all Washtenaw County)	3,000
Battle Creek	245
*Bay City	650
*Benton Harbor	650
*Detroit	75,000
*Flint	2,395
Grand Rapids	1,500
Iron County	160
Iron Mountain	105
*Jackson	375
*Kalamazoo	700
*Lansing	1,800
Marquette County	175
Mt. Clemens	420
Muskegon	525
*Saginaw	550
*South Haven	100
MINNESOTA	
Austin	125
*Duluth	1,000
Hibbing	155
*Minneapolis	22,090
*Rochester	240
*St. Paul	9,250
*Virginia	100
MISSISSIPPI	
*Clarksdale	160
*Cleveland	180
*Greenville	500
*Greenwood	100
*Hattiesburg	180
*Jackson	750
*Meridian	135
Natchez	140
Vicksburg	260
MISSOURI	
*Columbia	350
*Joplin	115
*Kansas City	20,000
Kennett	110
Springfield	230
*St. Joseph	490
*St. Louis	60,000
MONTANA	
*Billings	160

State and City	Jewish Population
NEBRASKA	
*Lincoln	800
*Omaha	6,500
NEVADA	
*Las Vegas	13,500
*Reno	1,200
NEW HAMPSHIRE	
*Claremont	130
*Concord	350
*Dover	425
Keene	105
Laconia	160
*Manchester	2,500
*Nashua	450
*Portsmouth	700
NEW JERSEY	
*Atlantic City (incl. Atlantic County)	11,800
*Bayonne	5,000
*Bergen County	100,000
*Bridgeton	375
*Camden	26,000
*Carteret	300
Elizabeth (incl. in Union County)	
*Englewood (also incl. in Bergen County)	10,000
*Essex County	95,000
Flemington	875
Gloucester County	165
Hoboken	500
*Jersey City	5,200
Metuchen (incl. in North Middlesex County)	
Millville	240
*Monmouth County	32,000
*Morris-Sussex Counties	15,000
Morristown (incl. in Morris County)	
*Mt. Holly	300
Newark (incl. in Essex County)	
New Brunswick (incl. in Raritan Valley)	
North Hudson County	7,000
*North Jersey	33,500
*Northern Middlesex County	19,000
*Ocean County	12,000
*Passaic-Clifton	7,600
Paterson (incl. in North Jersey)	
Perth Amboy (incl. in North Middlesex County)	
Plainfield (incl. in Union County)	
*Princeton	2,600
*Raritan Valley	18,000
Salem	230
*Somerset County	6,000
Somerville (incl. in Somerset County)	
Toms River (incl. in Ocean County)	
*Trenton	8,500
*Union County	39,500
*Vineland	3,335
*Wildwood	425
Willingboro (incl. in Camden)	
NEW MEXICO	
*Albuquerque	5,000
Las Cruces	100
Santa Fe	300
NEW YORK	
*Albany	13,500
Amenia	140
Amsterdam	595
*Auburn	315
*Batavia	165
Beacon	315
*Binghamton (incl. all Broome County)	4,000
Brewster (incl. in Danbury, Ct.)	
*Buffalo	22,000
Canandaigua	135
*Catskill	200
Corning	125
Cortland	440
Dunkirk	200
*Ellenville	1,450
*Elmira	1,400
*Geneva	300
*Glens Falls	360
*Gloversville	535
Herkimer	185
*Highland Falls	105
Hudson	470
*Ithaca	1,000
Jamestown	185
*Kingston	2,400
Liberty	2,100
Loch Sheldrake-Hurleyville	750
Monroe	400
*Monticello	2,400
Mountaindale	150
Greater New York	1,998,000
New York City	1,228,000
Manhattan	171,000
Brooklyn	514,000
Bronx	143,000
Queens	379,000
Staten Island	21,000
Nassau-Suffolk	605,000
Westchester	165,000

State and City	Jewish Population
New Paltz	150
Newark	220
*Newburgh-Middletown	4,900
*Niagara Falls	1,000
Norwich	120
*Olean	140
*Oneonta	175
Oswego	100
Parksville	140
Pawling	105
*Plattsburg	275
Port Jervis	560
*Potsdam	175
*Poughkeepsie	4,900
*Rochester	21,500
Rockland County	25,000
*Rome	205
*Saratoga Springs	500
*Schenectady	5,400
Sharon Springs	165
South Fallsburg	1,100
*Syracuse	11,000
*Troy	1,200
*Utica	2,250
Walden	200
Warwick	100
Watertown	250
White Lake	425
Woodbourne	200
Woodridge	300
NORTH CAROLINA	
*Asheville	1,000
*Chapel Hill-Durham	1,650
*Charlotte	3,200
*Fayetteville (incl. all Cumberland County)	500
*Gastonia	220
Goldsboro	120
*Greensboro	1,900
High Point	400
*Raleigh	1,375
Rocky Mount	110
Whiteville Zone	330
*Wilmington	500
Winston-Salem	440
NORTH DAKOTA	
*Fargo	500
Grand Forks	100
OHIO	
*Akron	6,500
Ashtabula	160
*Canton	2,600
*Cincinnati	28,500
*Cleveland	75,000
*Columbus	13,000
*Dayton	6,000
East Liverpool	290
*Elyria	275
Hamilton	560
*Lima	290
Lorain	1,000
*Mansfield	600
*Marion	150
*Middletown	140
New Philadelphia	140
Newark	105
Piqua	120
Portsmouth	120
*Sandusky	150
*Springfield	340
*Steubenville	405
*Toledo	7,500
*Warren	500
*Wooster	200
Youngstown	5,400
Zanesville	350
OKLAHOMA	
Muskogee	120
*Oklahoma City	2,000
Oklahoma City Zone	190
*Tulsa	2,600
OREGON	
Corvallis	140
*Eugene	1,500
*Portland	8,735
Salem	200
PENNSYLVANIA	
Aliquippa	400
*Allentown	4,980
*Altoona	1,200
Ambridge	250
Beaver	115
*Beaver Falls	350
Berwick	120
*Bethlehem	960
Braddock	250
*Bradford	150
Brownville	150
*Butler	365
Carbon County	125
*Carnegie	100
Central Bucks County	400
*Chambersburg	340
Chester	2,100
Coatesville	305
Connellsville	110
Donora	100
*Easton	1,300
Ellwood City	110
*Erie	930
Farrell	150
Greensburg	300
*Harrisburg	4,850
*Hazleton	700
Homestead	300
*Indiana	135
*Johnstown	500
Kittanning	175

State and City	Jewish Population
*Lancaster	1,900
*Lebanon	425
Lock Haven	140
*Lower Bucks County[1]	18,000
McKeesport	2,100
Monessen	100
Mt. Carmel	100
Mt. Pleasant	120
New Castle	400
*New Kensington	560
Norristown	2,000
North Penn	200
*Oil City	165
Oxford-Kennett Square	180
*Philadelphia Metropolitan Area	295,000
Phoenixville	300
*Pittsburgh	51,000
*Pottstown	700
Pottsville	500
*Reading	2,800
Sayre	100
*Scranton	4,000
Sharon	470
Shenandoah	230
*State College	450
Stroudsburg	410
Sunbury	160
*Uniontown	290
Upper Beaver	500
*Washington	325
Wayne County	210
West Chester	300
*Wilkes-Barre	4,300
Williamsport	770
*York	1,600
RHODE ISLAND	
*Providence (incl. rest of state)	22,000
SOUTH CAROLINA	
*Charleston	3,200
*Columbia	2,300
Florence	370
Greenville	600
Orangeburg County	105
*Spartanburg	295
Sumter	190
SOUTH DAKOTA	
*Sioux Falls	120
TENNESSEE	
*Chattanooga	2,250
Johnson City[1]	210
*Knoxville	1,350
*Memphis	9,000
*Nashville	3,700
Oak Ridge	240
TEXAS	
*Amarillo	300
*Austin	2,100
Baytown	300
*Beaumont	400
Brownsville	160
*Corpus Christi	1,040
*Dallas	20,000
De Witt County[1]	150
*El Paso	5,000
*Ft. Worth	3,000
*Galveston	620
*Houston	27,000
*Laredo	420
*Longview	185
*Lubbock	350
*McAllen	295
*North Texas Zone[4]	100
Odessa	150
Port Arthur	260
*San Antonio	6,900
Texarkana	100
*Tyler	500
*Waco	750
*Wharton	170
UTAH	
Ogden	100
*Salt Lake City	2,200
VERMONT	
Bennington	120
*Burlington	1,800
*Rutland	350
*St. Johnsbury	100
VIRGINIA	
*Alexandria (incl. Falls Church, Arlington County, and urbanized Fairfax County)[1]	30,000
Arlington (incl. in Alexandria)	
*Danville	180
Fredericksburg	140
Hampton (incl. in Newport News)	
*Harrisonburg	115
Hopewell	140
*Lynchburg	275
Martinsville	135
*Newport News (incl. Hampton)	3,000
*Norfolk (incl. Virginia Beach)	11,000
*Petersburg	600
*Portsmouth (incl. Suffolk)	1,100
*Richmond	10,000
*Roanoke	800
Williamsburg	120
*Winchester	110
WASHINGTON	
Bellingham	120

State and City	Jewish Population
Bremerton (incl. in Seattle)	
*Seattle	16,000
*Spokane	800
*Tacoma	750
WEST VIRGINIA	
*Bluefield-Princeton	190
*Charleston	1,150
*Clarksburg	205
Huntington	350
*Morgantown	200
*Parkersburg	155
Weirton	150
*Wheeling	650
WISCONSIN	
*Appleton	270
*Beloit	120
*Eau Claire	120
*Fond du Lac	100
Green Bay	440
*Kenosha	250
*Madison	3,000
Manitowoc	175
*Milwaukee	23,900
Oshkosh	120
*Racine	405
*Sheboygan	200
*Superior	165
Waukes	135
*Wausau	155
WYOMING	
*Cheyenne	255

*Denotes estimate submitted within two-year period.

[a]Florence, Sheffield, Tuscumbia.

[b]Towns in Chicot, Desha, Drew Counties.

[c]Includes Alta Loma, Chino, Claremont, Cucamonga, La Verne, Montclair, Ontario, Pomona, San Dimas, Upland.

[d]Centerbrook, Chester, Clinton, Deep River, Essex, Killingworth, Old Lyme, Old Saybrook, Seabrook, Westbrook.

[e]Ansonia, Derby-Shelton, Oxford, Seymour.

[f]Greater Washington includes urbanized portions of Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties, Maryland, Arlington County, Fairfax County (organized portion); Falls Church, Alexandria, Virginia.

[g]Rock Island, Moline (Illinois); Davenport, Bettendorf (Iowa).

[h]Towns in Alexander, Bond, Clay, Clinton, Crawford, Edwards, Effingham, Fayette, Franklin, Gallatin, Hamilton, Hardin, Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson, Jersey, Johnson, Lawrence, Mascoupin, Madison, Marion, Massac, Montgomery, Perry, Pope, Pulaski, Randolph, Richland, St. Clair, Saline, Union, Wabash, Washington, Wayne, White, Williamson Counties.

[i]Includes Crown Point, East Chicago, Gary, Hammond, Munster, Valparaiso, Whiting, and the Greater Calumet region.

[j]Towns in Caroline, Kent, Queen Annes, Talbot Counties.

[k]Allendale, Elmwood Park, Fair Lawn, Franklin Lakes, Oakland, Midland Park, Rochelle Park, Saddle Brook, Wykoff also included in North Jersey estimate.

[l]Includes Camden and Burlington Counties.

[m]Includes contiguous areas in Hudson, Morris, Somerset, and Union Counties.

[n]Includes Clayton, Paulsboro, Woodbury. Excludes Newfield; see Vineland.

[o]See footnote (m).

[p]Includes Guttenberg, Hudson Heights, North Bergen, North Hudson, Secaucus, Union City, Weehawken, West New York, Woodcliff.

[q]Includes Paterson, Wayne, Hawthorne in Passaic County, and nine towns in Bergen County. See footnote (k).

[r]Includes Perth Amboy, Metuchen, Edison Township (part), Woodbridge.

[5]Includes in Middlesex County, Cranbury, Dunellen, East Brunswick, Edison Township (part), Jamesburg, Matawan, Middlesex, Monmouth Junction, Old Bridge, Parlin, Piscataway, South River, Spottswood; in Somerset County, Kendall Park, Somerset; in Mercer County, Hightstown.

[6]Excludes Kendall Park and Somerset, which are included in Raritan Valley.

[7]Includes in Cumberland County, Norma, Rosenheim, Vineland; in Salem County, Elmer; in Gloucester County, Clayton, Newfield; in Cape May County, Woodbine.

[8]Burgaw, Clinton, Dunn, Elizabethtown, Fairmont, Jacksonville, Lumberton, Tabor City, Wallace, Warsaw; and Dillon, Loris, Marion, Mullins, S.C.

[9]Towns in Alfalfa, Beckham, Cadelo, Canadian, Cleveland, Custer, Jackson, Kingfisher, Kiowa, Lincoln, Logan, Oklahoma, Payne, Roger Mills, Tillman, Washita Counties.

[10]Bensalem Township, Bristol, Langhorne, Levittown, New Hope, Newtown, Penndel, Warington, Yardley.

[11]Includes Kingsport and Bristol (including the portion of Bristol in Virginia).

[12]Includes communities also in Colorado, Fayette, Gonzales, and La Vaca Counties.

[13]Denison, Gainesville, Greenville, Paris, Sherman, and Durant (Oklahoma).

World Jewish Population

THERE ARE NO PRECISE DATA on Jewish population in the various countries. The figures presented below represent the best possible estimates for 1978. They are based on local censuses, communal registration figures, and data obtained from a special inquiry conducted in 1977 (See AJYB, 1978, Vol. 78, p. 517). Some figures were obtained from local informants, mostly people involved in Jewish communal affairs. The figures are of varying degrees of accuracy and are subject to substantial margins of error. Where students of Jewish population differ significantly as to the estimated number of Jews in a particular country, this is so indicated. The figures will be revised when more accurate data become available.

DISTRIBUTION BY CONTINENTS

The estimated world Jewish population at the end of 1978 was 14,396,000. Of the total number, about 6,783,000 (47 per cent) lived in the Americas, some 4,142,000 (29 per cent) in Europe, including the Asian parts of Turkey and the USSR, and over 3,221,000 (22 per cent) in Asia. Only some 174,000 (1.5 per cent) remained in Africa, and 75,000 (0.5 per cent) in Australia and New Zealand.

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH POPULATION BY CONTINENTS, 1978

Continent	*Number*	*Per Cent*
Europe (including Asiatic USSR and Turkey)	4,142,450	29.0
America (North, Central, and South)	6,783,220	47.0
Asia	3,221,010	22.0
Africa	174,320	1.5
Australia and New Zealand	75,000	0.5
TOTAL	14,396,000*	100.0

*Because sources and dates were not always identical, there may be discrepancies between figures given in the tables below and those in other sections of this volume.

Various estimates have been put forward for the Jewish populations of the Soviet Union, the United States, Argentina, and France. If the lower estimate were accepted in each case, the total world Jewish population would be smaller by about one million than the estimate offered here.

Europe

Of the approximately 4,142,000 Jews in Europe, over 2,800,000 were in the Communist area, including 2,666,000 in the Soviet Union, 80,000 in Hungary, some 45,000 in Rumania, and about 6,000 in Poland. There was a continuing debate about the number of Jews in the USSR. Some Israeli scholars accepted the official Soviet figure, and suggested that, with continuing Jewish emigration, the number of Soviet Jews was below 2,000,000. Without going into details, it seems that a figure of about 2,600,000 is nearer to the actual situation (See "Soviet Jewry Since the Death of Stalin," AJYB, 1979, Vol. 79, pp. 79–80).

Over 1,300,000 Jews lived in non-Communist countries. France had about 650,000, making it the largest Jewish community in Western Europe. (Other sources estimated the French Jewish population as being 550,000). Great Britain had 410,000, Belgium 41,000, Italy 41,000, and Germany (including both East and West Germany) 38,000.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION IN EUROPE, BY COUNTRIES, 1978

Country	*Total Population*[a]	*Jewish Population*
Albania	2,620,000	300
Austria	7,520,000	13,000[b]
Belgium	9,830,000	41,000
Bulgaria	8,800,000	7,000
Czechoslovakia	15,030,000	13,000
Denmark	5,090,000	7,500[b]
Finland	4,740,000	1,350
France	53,080,000	650,000
Germany	79,210,000	38,000[b]
Gibraltar	30,000	650[b]
Great Britain	55,850,000	410,000
Greece	9,280,000	6,000
Hungary	10,650,000	80,000
Ireland	3,190,000	4,000
Italy	56,450,000	41,000
Luxembourg	360,000	1,000
Malta	330,000	50
Netherlands	13,850,000	30,000[b]
Norway	4,040,000	1,000
Poland	34,700,000	6,000
Portugal	9,730,000	600
Rumania	21,660,000	45,000
Spain	36,670,000	10,000
Sweden	8,260,000	16,000[b]
Switzerland	6,330,000	21,000
Turkey	42,130,000	27,000[b,c]

USSR	258,930,000	2,666,000
Yugoslavia	21,910,000	6,000
TOTAL		4,142,450

[a]United Nations Statistical Office, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, and other sources, including local publications.

[b]Includes West Germany, East Germany, and both sectors of Berlin.

[c]Includes Asian regions of the USSR and Turkey.

[d]Reply to 1977 inquiry.

North, Central, and South America

The number of Jews in the United States, including all persons living in Jewish households, was estimated at about 5,860,900 (see the article "Jewish Population in the United States, 1979" in this volume.) Some Israeli demographers disagreed with this figure and suggested an estimate one quarter million smaller. Canada had an estimated 305,000 Jews, and Central and South America about 580,000. The Jewish population figure for Argentina was 300,000. While this estimate was accepted by some local informants, it was contested by others.

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION IN NORTH, CENTRAL, AND SOUTH AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES, BY COUNTRIES, 1978

Country	*Total Population*[a]	*Jewish Population*
Canada	23,280,000	305,000[d]
Mexico	64,590,000	37,500
United States	216,820,000	5,860,900
Total North America		6,203,400
Barbados	250,000	70[d]
Costa Rica	2,060,000	2,500[d]
Cuba	9,600,000	1,500
Curacao	150,000	700
Dominican Republic	4,980,000	250
El Salvador	4,260,000	350[d]
Guatemala	6,440,000	2,000
Haiti	4,750,000	150
Honduras	2,830,000	200
Jamaica	2,090,000	500
Nicaragua	2,310,000	200
Panama	1,770,000	2,000
Trinidad	1,100,000	500
Total Central America and West Indies		10,920
Argentina	26,060,000	300,000
Bolivia	5,950,000	2,000
Brazil	112,240,000	150,000[d]

Chile	10,660,000	28,000
Colombia	25,050,000	14,000
Ecuador	7,560,000	1,000
Paraguay	2,800,000	1,200
Peru	16,360,000	5,200[c]
Surinam	450,000	500
Uruguay	2,850,000	50,000
Venezuela	12,740,000	17,000
Total South America		568,900
TOTAL		6,783,220

[a]See Table 2, note[3].
[c]See Table 2, note[c].

Asia, Australia, and New Zealand

The Jewish population of Asia was 3,221,410. Of this figure, 3,135,000, or approximately 97 per cent, were in Israel, the second largest Jewish population center in the world. There were 70,000 Jews in Iran and 8,000 in India. It was difficult to ascertain if events in Lebanon had any impact on the number of Jews in Lebanon and Syria.

The Jewish population of Australia was estimated at about 70,000, and that of New Zealand at 5,000.

TABLE 4. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION IN ASIA, BY COUNTRIES, 1978

Country	*Total Population*[a]	*Jewish Population*
Afghanistan	17,450,000	200
Burma	31,510,000	200
China	865,680,000	30
Cyprus	640,000	30
Hong Kong	4,510,000	250
India	625,820,000	8,000[c]
Indonesia	143,280,000	100
Iran	34,270,000	70,000
Iraq	11,910,000	450
Israel	3,730,000	3,135,000
Japan	113,860,000	400[3]
Lebanon	3,060,000	400
Pakistan	75,280,000	250
Philippines	54,030,000	200
Singapore	2,310,000	500
Syria	7,840,000	4,500
Yemen	7,080,000	500
TOTAL		3,221,010

[a]See Table 2, note[a].
[c]See Table 2, note[c].

TABLE 5. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, 1978

Country	*Total Population*[a]	*Jewish Population*
Australia	14,070,000	70,000[b]
New Zealand	3,111,000	5,000
TOTAL		75,000

[a]See Table 2, note[a].
[b]See Table 2, note[c].

Africa

The Jewish population of Africa stood at about 175,770, including some 118,000 in South Africa. It was not clear whether events in Rhodesia had a substantial impact on the number of Jews there. An estimated 22,000 were in Ethiopia. The Jewish communities of the Maghreb were very small—some 22,000 in Morocco, 7,000 in Tunisia, and about 1,000 in Algeria. Egypt had 400 Jews and Libya 20.

TABLE 6. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION IN AFRICA, BY COUNTRIES, 1978

Country	*Total Population*[a]	*Jewish Population*
Algeria	17,300,000	1,000
Egypt	38,070,000	400
Ethiopia	28,680,000	22,000
Kenya	13,850,000	300
Libya	2,440,000	20
Morocco	17,830,000	22,000
Republic of South Africa	26,130,000	118,000[b]
Rhodesia	6,530,000	3,000
Tunisia	5,740,000	7,000
Zaire	25,630,000	200
Zambia	5,140,000	400
TOTAL		174,320

[a]See Table 2, note[a].
[b]See Table 2, note[c].

COMMUNITIES WITH LARGEST JEWISH POPULATION

The largest Jewish community was in the United States, followed by Israel and the Soviet Union. Together they accounted for some 81 per cent of the world Jewish population. France, Great Britain, Canada, and Argentina had Jewish communities of 300,000 or over. Brazil had a Jewish population of 150,000, while that of South Africa stood at 118,000. The balance of the countries had Jewish communities of less than 100,000 each.

TABLE 7. COUNTRIES WITH LARGEST JEWISH POPULATION

Country	*Jewish Population*
United States	5,860,900
Israel	3,135,000
Soviet Union	2,666,000
France	650,000
Great Britain	410,000
Canada	305,000
Argentina	300,000

TABLE 8. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION, SELECTED CITIES*

City	*Jewish Population*
Adelaide	1,600[5]
Amsterdam	20,000[5]
Ankara	550[5]
Antwerp	13,000
Athens	2,800
Auckland	1,500
Basel	2,300
Belgrade	1,500
Berlin (both sectors)	6,000
Bern	800
Bogota	5,500
Bombay (and district)	6,970[5]
Bordeaux	7,500
Brisbane	1,500[5]
Brussels	24,500
Bucharest	40,000
Budapest	65,000
Calcutta	300[5]

Cape Town	25,650[5]
Cochin	500
Copenhagen	7,000[5]
Durban	5,990[5]
Florence	1,400
Geneva	3,250
Glasgow	13,000[5]
Goteborg	4,000[5]
Grenoble	8,000
Guatemala City	1,500
Haifa	210,000
Helsinki	1,000
Istanbul	23,000[5]
Izmir	2,500[5]
Jerusalem	272,000
Johannesburg	57,500
Kharkov	80,000
Kiev	170,000
Kobe	80[5]
Leeds	18,000[5]
Leningrad	165,000
Lima[2]	5,000[5]
Lisbon	550
Liverpool	6,500[5]
London (greater)	280,000[5]
Luxembourg	850
Lyons	20,000
Madrid	3,000
Malmo	4,000[5]
Manchester (greater)	35,000[5]
Manila	300
Marseille	65,000
Melbourne	34,000
Mexico, D.F.	32,500
Milan	9,000
Montevideo	48,000
Montreal	115,000[5]
Moscow	285,000
Nice	20,000
Odessa	120,000
Oslo	750
Ottawa	7,500[5]
Paris	300,000

Perth	3,200[a]
Plovdiv	1,000
Porto Alegre	12,000[a]
Prague	3,000
Rabat	2,500
Recife	3,000[a]
Rio de Janeiro	55,000[a]
Rome	12,000
Salisbury	2,000[a]
Salonika	1,300
San Jose	2,500[a]
Sao Paulo	75,000[a]
Sarajevo	1,100
Sofia	4,000
Stockholm	8,000[a]
Strasbourg	12,000
Subotica	250
Sverdlovsk	40,000
Sydney	28,500[a]
Teheran	50,000
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	394,000
Tokyo	320[a]
Toronto	115,000[a]
Toulouse	18,000
Trieste	1,200
Vancouver	12,000[a]
Valparaiso	4,000
Vienna	10,000
Wellington	1,500
Warsaw	4,500
Winnipeg	20,000[a]
Zagreb	1,200
Zhitomir	20,000
Zurich	6,150

*For cities in the United States, see Table 3 of the article "Jewish Population in the United States" in this volume.

[a]See Table 2, note[a].

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